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Abstract

This paper is designed to be a handbook for wilderness managers and advocates.
It begins with observations about wilderness case law in general, follow ed by an
overview o f how to research a potential lawsuit and what resources are available to nonlawyers interested in agency wilderness management. The second part o f the handbook
contains summaries o f 14 cases, organized by subject, that pertain to wilderness areas.
T w o cases that were pertinent to wilderness were omitted because wilderness issues were
resolved before litigation and the case issue in each was a matter o f money to be paid to
owners o f inholdings after wilderness designation o f the areas. All other relevant cases to
date are included.
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Introduction
A lthough litigation m ay not be the m ost efficient or expert means of
answering w ilderness m anagem ent questions, it is currently one of the few
options available to the public and the government. Perhaps a more specific
W ilderness Act (one that w ould give governm ent agencies more direction in
management) could settle disputes outside of court, but a new w ilderness bill is
not pending nor w ould it necessarily shrink the num ber of suits brought to court
over w ilderness issues. Preservationists will always dem and m ore wilderness
protection than developers will and individuals will always pursue private
rights in w ilderness regardless of the strictness of the statute ihat is passed.
Therefore, it is im portant that people understand wilderness case law and how it
may be useful for them to work for continued wilderness preservation.
O bservations
After reviewing these 14 wilderness cases as a citizen, I have a few
comments to make about wilderness case law. First, while these 14 cases took
place in wilderness, the courts do not rely solely on the W ilderness Act to make
their decisions. In fact, the cases reference a num ber of statutes in addition to the
W ilderness Act. There are few provisions in the Wilderness Act that are specific
guidelines for managem ent, but the overall language of the Act is vague. As a
result, the courts rely on other statutes that apply to the different w ilderness
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areas in question. A list of statutes that have been used in wilderness case law to
date is found in A ppendix A.
Second, the courts are w ary of issues that have not been finalized at an
agency's adm inistrative level. In fact, it seems evident that an agency m ust make
a decision on an issue before a court will deliver a holding in the case. If you are
involved w ith an agency decision that has not been finalized, you w ould be wise
to w ait to take the issue to court until a final decision is made to avoid added cost
and wasted time.
Lastly, w hen the W ilderness Act is p art of a case, there are two things that
are reliable about the court's interpretation of the Act. First, if a provision
applies to the issue that includes a w aiver in the case of 'valid existing rights,' the
court will likely decide in favor of the rights. Pay attention to whether valid
existing rights can be established by you or the opposing side. The provisions m
the W ilderness Act that include a 'valid existing right' clause are: Section 1133(d)
that contains prohibitions about "commercial enterprise, perm anent or
tem porary roads, mechanical transports, and structures or installations...," and
section 1133(d)(3) that includes "[mjining and mineral leasing laws; leases,
permits, and licenses; w ithdraw al of minerals from appropriation and
disposition." There are other statutes that include 'valid existing right'
exceptions. If pre-existing rights are a potential issue, any relevant statutes
should be read closely for 'valid existing rights' exceptions. Second, if the
relevant provision of the Act includes the language, "subject to such restrictions
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as the Secretary...deem s desirable" or "such reaisonable regulations governing
...as m ay be prescribed by the Secretary/' the court will tend to defer to the
agency's discretion. Again, read relevant statutes closely for this language. It
will allow you to predict better the court's interpretation of your case.
Keep these observations in m ind as you read the overview and the case
summaries.
Note to Non-agency W ilderness Advocates
Suppose you disagreed w ith a government agency's wilderness
m anagem ent decision that affects one of your favorite spots. Have you ever
considered w hat options you have to contest the decision? Unfortunately, if you
have not acted by the time the decision has been finalized, you may not have any
options. To attem pt to influence an agency decision, the first step is to contact
the agency staff w orking on the m anagem ent decision. Make an appointm ent
w ith the agency person in charge of the project (and any other people involved)
to introduce yourself and establish a relationship. Ask questions about the
proposal, express your concerns and determine w hat you can do to help in the
planning process. Establish a d ia lo ^ e about the planning decisions and w hy
you agree or disagree w ith the managem ent plans. Discussion could resolve the
issues that concern you before the comment or litigation stage.
If you do expect to reach the litigation stage, it is im portant to consider the
steps required to secure standing in court. A case will not be heard in court
unless the plaintiffs have standing. The question of standing is determ ined by
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"w hether...the plaintiff has show n an injury to himself that is likely to be
redressed by a favorable decision." Idaho Conservation League v. Mumma, 956 F.2d
1508 (9* Cir. 1992) quoting Simon v. Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26.
In order to have standing in a w ilderness case, you m ust establish that you (or a
mem ber of your group) have visited the area in question and that you will be
negatively affected by the m anagem ent decision. Other steps required to have
standing include participating in the comment period.
After meeting w ith agency staff, participate in the public comment
process. W hen a governm ent agency announces a pending decision, it invites
the public to comment on the proposed action. After receiving comments, the
agency will issue its decision after consideration of public input. Forest Service
and Bureau of Land M anagement decisions may be appealed in writing to the
agency's administration.^ Before bringing a lawsuit against these agencies (USFS
and BLM)—to have standing for a lawsuit—a plaintiff m ust have exhausted the
available adm inistrative appeal remedies. Neither the National Park Service nor
the Fish and Wildlife Service have an appeals process. As a result, it is im portant
to become involved w ith the situation at the comment stage for all agency
planning. In w riting comments, m ention any issue about which you are
concerned. In order to bring a challenge over a particular issue in court, you
m ust have raised it in the com ment period. Furthermore, include any case cites
*Each agency has a different appeal process. Contact the agency to determine
what is required in your situation.
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that support your opinion to bolster the impact of your comments. Therefore, if
you are interested in a w ilderness area, it is prudent to stay aware of proposed
agency actions and pending decisions at the adm inistrative level. Contact the
agencies to be p u t on their mailing or e-mail lists.
If you participated in the com ment process (and, if appropriate,
adm inistratively appealed and were denied), it could be appropriate to consider
a lawsuit. The purpose of this paper is to give w ilderness advocates w ith an
interest in w ilderness m anagem ent some ideas of w here to start if considering
initiating a lawsuit. There are several im portant considerations of wilderness
case law that can help you decide w hether you have a legitimate case and, if so,
that can help make the process of bringing a suit easier.
Taking Action
The first step in developing a case is to w rite out all the facts involved.
This should be started as soon as you learn of the facts, but at the latest, during
the comment period before a draft environm ental impact statement or
environm ental assessment. Fundamentally, court decisions are based on facts.
Three cases could be in the same wilderness area, but the decisions may all be
different depending on the facts of the situation. Consider the two Stupak-Thrall
cases that both contested Forest Service Forest Plan am endments m the Sylvania
Wilderness. The cases involved the same location and the same people, b u t the
court reached different conclusions in each. The court in the first case held that
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the Forest Service Forest Plan am endm ent restricting the use of "electronic fishfinders, boom-boxes, and other mechanical or battery-operated devices" was
appropriate. 843 F. Supp. at 327. In the second case, the court decided that the
Forest Service Forest Plan am endm ent restricting the use of gas-powered
motorboats in the Sylvania W ilderness infringed on the plaintiffs' valid existing
rights.2 The court held that the plaintiffs proved that their use of motorboats w as
a valid existing right before the am endm ent was passed and was crucial to their
livelihood. Facts such as bookkeeping evidence to show how that the use of
motorboats w ere im portant to a plaintiffs' businesses w ould be valuable in
presenting a credible case. Facts that could be im portant in general include the
results of ecological studies, business receipts or expert opinions. Therefore,
clearly research and w rite out the facts of your case.
Next, visit a law library to begin a review of other cases. The United
States Code A nnotated for the W ilderness Act, 16 U.S.C.A. 1131 et seq., lists all
cases that refer to the W ilderness Act. Read through other cases in your court's
jurisdiction to find ones that have similar facts. Federal courts are organized in
circuits, typically divided geographically. A law library will have a m ap of
courts and will help you decide in w hich jurisdiction you are. W hen comparing
facts between cases, you m ay find that no cases are similar, but remember that
courts pay attention to details, so a minor fact in everyday life may be useful in

^ The Michigan W ilderness Act states that the W ilderness Act is subject to
'valid existing rights" of Michigan citizens.
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court. If you find a case that has similar facts, follow the reasoning of the court to
see if it could apply to your case.
Studying other cases for similarities means that you are looking for
precedents in case law. A precedent is a case that establishes law for that court
and all lower courts in the circuit. If a case has been decided at the Supreme
Court level, for example, all district and appellate courts will abide by that
decision. Similarly, cases decided by the U nited States Court of Appeals for the
Tenth Circuit, for example, generally require that all lower courts in that circuit
follow the law established in the case. O n rare occasions, a court will overturn
one of its ow n decisions if it decides the case w as not correctly decided, but
usually, a precedent is followed. If in all relevant cases the court decided against
your contention, if it deferred to agency discretion, for example, there is slim
chance that you will succeed in court. However, if precedents support your
argum ent, then you have a stronger chance of winning. Always double-check
that a case decision still stands and w as not overturned by a later decision. It
will save you hours of frustration.
As you read similar cases, note all the laws that were involved and
determ ine the ones that apply to your situation.^ Research in the library for any
other laws that are relevant, read them closely and note specific clauses that
support your contention. For example, if you are concerned about an insect

^ Relevant statutes to date are found in Appendix A.
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control program in wilderness, note that the W ilderness Act states that the
Secretary [of Agriculture] m ay take "such measures [within Wilderness Areas] ...
as m ay be necessary in control of fire, insects, and diseases, subject to such
conditions as the Secretary deems desirable." 16 U.S.C.A. § 1123(d)(1) (1982).
C ourts often rely on specific language to make their decision so attention to
language is very important. In addition, research the statute's legislative history
so you understand the intent of the legislators in enacting the bill. Investigate
any relevant adm inistrative history, w hich may also be im portant in the court's
decision-making process.^ You will be well-prepared in the beginning stages of
bringing your suit if you know the language of the relevant statutes, the intent of
the legislators, and the history of tiie agency's adm inistrative process.
Furtherm ore, gathering this inform ation may help you determ ine w hether you
have a solid case. That is, if there is no specific language or administrative
history that supports your argum ent, odds of success are diminished.
Should you decide to proceed w ith a lawsuit, the following discussion
illustrates the topics covered thus far, using real cases as examples.
M ore abo u t Precedent
Of the fourteen wilderness case law summaries included in this paper,
nine set precedents in the court's jurisdiction. Four precedential cases were at

^ Records of congressional hearings and other pertinent legislative history can be
found in the government documents section of a library. Administrative history
information may be requested about a particular area through the relevant government
agency.
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the appellate level and five w ere at the district court level.^ Two of the four
appellate cases concerned the Boundary W aters Canoe Area Wilderness in
Minnesota: State of Minnesota by Alexander v. Block, 660 F. 2d 1240 (8*^ Cir. 1981),
and Minnesota Public Interest Group v. Butz, 541 F. 2d 1292 (8* Cir. 1976).
Lakefront w ater rights in the Sylvania wilderness in Michigan were at issue in
Stupak-Thrall v. United States, 843 F. Supp. 327 (W.D. Mich 1994)^. Clouser v. Espy,
42 F. 3d 1522 (9* Cir. 1994), considered access to mining claims in Kalmiopsis
and N orth Fork John Day W ilderness Area in Oregon.
The six cases decided at the district court level included U.S. v. Gregg, 290
F. Supp. 706 (W.D.Wash. 1968), w hich established that airplanes were illegal
w ithin wilderness unless a special exception w as m ade by the Secretary. One
case, Stupak-Thrall II, 988 F. Supp. 1055 (W.D. Mich. 1997), held that banning gaspow ered m otorboats in the Sylvania Wilderness constituted a taking of the
plaintiff's valid existing right to operate motorboats for business. Sierra Club v.
Lyng, 663 F. Supp. 556 (D.D.C. 1987), considered a Southern Pine Beetle program
in a wilderness area and decided that it w as an appropriate program within

^ A case is first heard at the district level. If the district court’s decision is
appealed by one of the parties, the case is heard at the appellate level.
®The case was heard en banc before the United States Court of Appeals for the
Sixth Circuit. The court was equally divided so that the earlier appellate decision by a
panel of three judges was vacated and the district court mling automatically was affirmed
because there were not sufficient votes to reverse it. Anyone relying on the district court
case, however, should be aware that one-half of the appellate court disagreed with the
decision, leaving some question as to how other courts considering the issue would
resolve it.
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wilderness managem ent guidelines. McGrail & Rowley v. Babbitt, 986 F. Supp,
1386 (S.D. Fla. 1997), explained how the Property Clause of the Constitution
gives Congress, and through delegation, federal agencies, the right to regulate
non-federal w aters and lands. The court in Audubon v. Hodel, 606 F. Supp. 825
(D. Alaska 1984), reversed a land transfer of wilderness in Alaska that Secretary
H odel defended under the Alaska National Interest Lands Conservation Act
(ANILCA). 16U .S.C .§3101etseq.
The following federal statutes address the m anagem ent of wilderness
areas. The W ilderness Act of 1964,16 U.S.C.A. § 1131 et seq.; the National
Environmental Policy Act, 42 U.S.C.A. § 4321 et seq.; and the Alaska National
Interest Lands Conservation Act, 16 U.S.C. § 3101 et seq. In addition, the
Property Clause of the U nited States Constitution, U.S.C.A. Constitution (Article
4, § 3, clause 2) has been used several times by the courts in their decisions about
public land management. The Property Clause reads: "The Congress shall have
the Power to dispose of and make all Rules and Regulations respecting the
territory or other Property belonging to the United States..." United States
Constitution, Article IV, § 3, cl. 2. Studying the incorporation of the Property
Clause in several decisions illustrates how a precedent is useful for later cases.
Three cases. State of Minnesota v. Block, 660 F. 2d 1240; Stupak-Thrall v. U.S., 843 F.
Supp. 827; and McGrail & Rowley v. Babbitt, 986 F. Supp. 1386, provide an
example of how a case uses precedent, how it has been useful in wilderness case
law, and how it is a tool for later courts.
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11
In State of Minnesota by Alexander v. Block, 660 F, 2d 1240, one of the issues
before the court w as w hether Congress (and through delegation, the Forest
Service) could regulate m otorized use in the Boundary Waters Canoe Area. The
court held that Congress had the authority to regulate non-federal lands and
w aters according to the Property Clause of the Constitution as long as the
regulations were for the overall good of the public lands. The court referred to
precedents, Kleppe v. New Mexico, 426 U.S. 529, and United States v. Brown, 431
U.S. 949, and Camfield v. United States, 167 U.S. 518, in which the Supreme Court
ruled that the Property Clause could include private or state land.
In Stupak-Thrall, a similar case questioned the regulation of "electronic
fish-fmders, boom-boxes, and other mechanical or battery-operated devices."
843 F. Supp. at 327. The court referred to several precedents: Kleppe v. New
Mexico, 426 U.S. 529, United States v. Brown, 431 U.S. 949, Camfield v. United States,
167 U.S. 518, and State of Minnesota by Alexander v. Block, 660 F. 2d 1240, in its
conclusion that the Property Clause allowed regulation of non-federal lands as
long as the regulations were reasonable. In Stupak-Thrall, the regulations were to
keep the area in compliance w ith its new wilderness designation.
The court in McGrail & Rowley v. Babbitt, 986 F. Supp. 1386, referred to the
Property Clause in its decision to explain w hy the Fish and Wildlife Service
could regulate commercial use of federal lands including subm erged lands and
adjacent state waters. The decision refers the reader to and includes language
from State of Minnesota by Alexander v. Block: "'Congress clearly has the pow er to
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12
dedicate federal lands for particular purposes. As a necessary incident of that
pow er. Congress m ust have the ability to insure that these lands be protected
against interference w ith their intended purposes."' 986 F. Supp. at 1386 quoting
660 F. 2d 1240.
It is evident in these three examples that precedent is an im portant tool for
courts and that over tim e precedential law may create trends in wilderness
management. That is, as the Property Clause applies to a range of wilderness
m anagem ent issues, wilderness m anagers will need to keep it in m ind as they
regulate non-federal lands, w here necessary, in an environmentally-sound
m anner while considering private rights before acting.
Interpretation of Laws
In addition to using precedents, courts pay close attention to specific
language in the statute applicable to a case. In Sierra Club v. Lyng, 663 F. Supp.
556, and Clouser v. Espy, 42 F. 3d 1522, the courts made their decisions according
to language in specific clauses in the W ilderness Act. In Sierra v. Lyng, which
concerned a federal beetle-control program in wilderness, the court noted that
the W ilderness Act "authorizes the Secretary to carry out 'such measures [within
W ilderness Areas] ... as m ay be necessary in control of fire, insects, and diseases,
subject to such conditions as the Secretary deems desirable,"' 663 F. Supp. at 558
quoting 16 U.S.C. § 1123(d)(l)(1982). The court reasoned that the Wilderness Act
gave the Secretary the authority to carry out a beetle control program in
wilderness. The court then determ ined that the Secretary's decision was
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reasonable and that his actions w ould not sacrifice wilderness quality for the
interests of nearby private land owners.
In Clouser v. Espy, 42 F. 3d at 1534, the court w as to decide if the Forest
Service had the right to determ ine the means of access to mining claims within
wilderness. The court quoted the W ilderness Act:
In any case w here valid m ining claims or other valid occupancies
are wholly w ithin a designated national forest wilderness area, the
Secretary of Agriculture shall by reasonable regulations consistent
w ith the preservation of the area as wilderness, perm it ingress and
egress to such surrounded areas by means w hich have been or are
being customarily enjoyed w ith respect to other such areas
similarly situated. 16 U.S.C. § 1134(b).
The W ilderness Act provided the im portant language that provided the basis for
the court's decision.^
In other cases, the language of the statute m ust be supplem ented by other
information, such as a history of the statute, legislative intent, or other facts
relevant to the situation. In Minnesota Public Interest Research Group v. Butz, 541 F.
2d at 1297, the court studied the W ilderness Act, which contains a special
provision allowing timber production in the Boundary Waters Canoe Area. The
special provision states:
O ther provisions of this chapter to the contrary notwithstanding,
the m anagem ent of the Boundary Waters Canoe Area ... shall be in
accordance w ith regulations established by the Secretary of
A griculture in accordance w ith the general purpose of maintaining.
^ When an agency acts, it acts under the delegation of authority by Congress or
the relevant Secretary, as provided by statute. The Forest Service has the authority to
regulate the National Forest System according to regulations and statutes through the
Organic Administrative Act of 1897, 16 U.S.C. § 478,551.
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w ithout unnecessary restrictions on other uses, including that of
timber, the prim itive character of the area, particularly in the
vicinity of lakes, stream s and portag es.... 16 U.S.C. §1133(d)(5).
Timber was included by legislators as an "other use" leading the court to decide
that logging w as perm itted in certain situations. To help clarify the issue, the
court considered the adm inistrative history of designation of the Boundary
W aters Canoe Area as a wilderness. Specifically, the court noted that the
Boundary W aters Canoe Area w as a unique wilderness that had never been
m anaged as a "pure w ilderness." In its decision, the court incorporated this
information from the legislative intent and adm inistrative history into its
decision that tim ber production w as allowed in the Boundary Waters Canoe
A rea's Portal Zone. 541 F. 2d at 1307.
A nother example is National Audubon v. Hodel, 606 F. Supp. 825, in which
the plaintiffs challenged a land exchange authorized by Secretary of Interior
Hodel. The court looked to the applicable statutes. Section 1302(h) of Alaska
National Interest Lands Conservation Act provides that a land exchange m ust be
in the 'public interest.' In reviewing the Secretary's reasoning for authorizing
the transfer of a w ilderness island for lands w ithin a refuge, the court looked to
relevant facts as they related to the statutory language. The language of the
statute served as a guide in the court's research. The court studied the potential
impact of the exchange on St. M atthew Island. Information about the natural
environm ent on St. M atthew Island and the proposed development on the island
led the court to determ ine that the land exchange would be detrimental to the
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unique w ilderness environm ent on the island. Therefore, the court held that the
exchange would not improve national conservation objectives and was in poor
judgm ent. Id at 846.
Judicial Involvem ent versus A gency D iscretion
Often a case is not decided even after consulting statutes and
incorporating an interpretation of the m eaning or intent of the statute. In those
cases, the court may defer to the governm ent agency involved. Agency
discretion is an im portant aspect of wilderness case law (and management) as
the courts reason that the agency m ade a particular m anagem ent decision based
on expert opinions in the relevant field. The idea is that the courts know the law
while the agency experts know the science. In Sierra Club v. Lyng, 663 F. Supp. at
560, the court ultimately trusted the Secretary's, and therefore the Forest
Service's, determ ination that the beetle program was reasonable. In the same
case the court decided that a beetle program could be conducted w ithin a
wilderness (see above). But once the court held that a beetle control program
could be carried o ut in a wilderness, it deferred to the agency's discretion on the
legitimacy of the particular program .
In Sierra Club v. Yeutter, 911 F. 2d 1405 (10^ Cir. 1990), federal reserved
w ater rights were at issue. Plaintiffs contended that federal reserved water rights
existed in Colorado wilderness. The court held that the Wilderness Act did not
m andate how agencies should memage potential federal reserved w ater rights.
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and that m anagem ent of such rights should be left to the discretion of the
particular agency and w as not an issue for the courts to decide.
Conversely, cases in which the court disagrees w ith a government
agency's decision are rare. In wilderness case law there are two examples. The
court in Audubon v. Hodel, 606 F. Supp. at 846, found that Secretary Hodel had
used poor judgm ent in authorizing the St. M atthew Island land exchange.
A lthough the court held that the Secretary's decision was not arbitrary and
capricious, it cancelled the land transfer and criticized the Secretary's decision as
an abuse of discretion. In Stupak-Thrall v. Glickman, 988 F. Supp. 1055 (W.D.Mich.
1997), the court decided against the Forest Service in holding that the plaintiffs'
use of m otorboats w as a valid existing right. The Forest Service had issued a
regulation banning the use of m otorboats in the Sylvania Wilderness. The
plaintiffs successfully challenged the Forest Service's decision w hen the court
held that the Forest Service A m endm ent infringed on their use of motorboats for
their livelihoods under the Fifth A m endm ent of the Constitution.
Last W ords
Finally, a lawsuit requires time, energy and money. Seriously consider
the options available to you before instigating the legal process. Once you have
assembled your facts, consult an attorney for advice on w hether to and how to
proceed. Consult like-minded environm ental groups (with or w ithout legal
staffs) in your com m unity for guidance. M any groups have been involved in
litigation over public land issues and m ay have suggestions to make the process
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easier.8 If you have a prom ising case, other groups and individuals may w ant to
join you as plaintiffs. Overall, remember to be involved at the decision-making
process through public com ment and appeals so that litigation may not be
necessary and, if it is, you or your group is legally entitled to bring a suit.
The next section of this paper includes case summaries of lawsuits that
have pertained to w ilderness areas. Part One includes cases that set precedents
in their jurisdictions and the cases are organized by subject. As you read the
cases, consider any corollaries to the issue that concerns you—the case
summ aries may be useful to you regardless of the fact that the subject of the case
m ay be unrelated to your issue. Part Two contains cases that are of interest, but
do not offer precedents in their jurisdictions. The district court decision may
have been overturned by the appellate court, and the case issue rem anded to the
agency for a final decision. Or, an issue may have been resolved before the
appellate court heard the case, rendering the court's decision irrelevant. These
cases are divided by subject as well. The appendix lists useful statutes. Code of
Federal Regulation references, agency m anual references and websites.

* An environm ental group w ith litigation experience may be able to refer
you to a lawyer willing to help you on a pro bono basis.
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M innesota Public Interest Research Group v. B utz
541F. 2d 1292 (8* Cir. 1976)

Case H istory
401 F. Supp. 1276 (1975)— reversed by 541 F. 2d 1292 (1976)— stay denied by
429 U.S. 935,97 S. Ct. 347— A N D cert, denied by 430 U.S. 922,97 S. Ct. 1340.
Background
The defendants appealed the district court's decision to grant a perm anent
injunction against present and future logging in areas of and next to virgin forest
in the Portal Zone of the Boundary W aters Canoe Area (BWCA).
The Boundary W ater Canoe A rea contains two sections w ithin its borders:
the Portal and Interior Zone. The Portal Zone contains approximately 412,000
acres in which timber production has been perm itted. The Interior Zone contains
approximately 618,000 acres, in w hich logging has been prohibited.
Plaintiffs' Identities an d C ontentions
Minnesota Public Interest G roup and Sierra Club, appellees.
The plaintiffs argued that logging w as prohibited in virgin forest areas in
the Boundary W aters Canoe A rea according to the national Wilderness Act of
1964 (Wilderness Act). 16 U.S.C.A. § 1131 et seq. In addition, they argued that
the Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) was inadequate under the National
Environmental Policy Act (NEPA). 42 U.S.C.A. § 4332.

18
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D efendants' Identities and C ontentions
Earl V. Butz, Individually and as Secretary of Agriculture, et a l,
appellants.
The defendants contended that logging w as perm itted in the Wilderness
Act under the special provision regarding the BWCA. They also claimed that the
EIS w as adequate u nder NEPA.
Case Issues
(1) Did the W ilderness Act of 1964,16 U.S.C.A. § 1131 et seq., prohibit
logging in the virgin forest areas of the Boundary Waters Canoe Area?
(2) Did the Forest Service's Environm ental Impact Statement (EIS) meet
the requirem ents of the National Environm ental Policy Act (NEPA)? 42 U.S.C.A.
§4332.
C ourt's H oldings
On w hether the W ilderness Act prohibited logging: The court of appeals
held that logging w as perm itted in certain parts of the Portal Zone, according to
provisions of the W ilderness Act of 1964. 16 U.S.C. § 1131 et seq. The court
determ ined that the W ilderness Act's ban on commercial logging in Boundary
Water Canoe Area sections contiguous to virgin forest was dependent on certain
exceptions, "'subject to existing private rights,' and other exceptions in the Act."
16 U .S .C § 1133(c).

Boundary Waters Canoe Area
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The BWCA is included in a specific exception w ithin the
W ilderness Act. O ther provisions of this chapter to the contrary
notw ithstanding, the m anagem ent of the Boundary Waters Canoe
Area, formerly designated as the Superior, Little Indian Sioux, and
Caribou Roadless Areas, in the Superior National Forest,
Minnesota}, shall be in accordance w ith regulations established by
the Secretary of Agriculture in accordance w ith the general purpose
of maintaining, w ithout unnecessary restrictions on other uses,
including that of timber, the primitive character of the area,
particularly in the vicinity of lakes, streams, and portages: Provided,
That nothing in this chapter shall preclude the continuance within
the area of any established use of motorboats." 16 U.S.C. §
1133(d)(5).
The court of appeals determ ined three points from their reading of the
statute. First, the BWCA was subject to special treatm ent regarding logging in
the wilderness. Second, m anagem ent of the BWCA w as delegated by Congress
to the Secretary of Agriculture. Third, m anagem ent of the BWCA should protect
the prim itive quality of the area w ithout undue restrictions on timber and other
uses. Furthermore, the court found that the adm inistrative and legislative
history of the BWCA proved that logging w as present at the time of designation
of the BWCA and w as approved w ithin the Portal Zone, even in virgin areas
aw ay from shoreline areas. 541 F. 2d at 1297.
As a final point on the special provision issue, the court explained that the
BWCA "has never been m anaged as a pure w ilderness area. The Wilderness Act
did not change this m anagem ent policy. The Act preserved the traditional
BWCA managem ent policy of m ultiple use." 541 F. 2d at 1298. Therefore,
Boundary Waters Canoe Area
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referring to both legislative and statutory interpretation, the court found that the
district court erred in its finding and stated that timber was a legitimate use in
the BWCA's Portal Zone.
On w hether or not the EIS w as adequate: The court outlined three
purposes of an Environmental Im pact Statement (EIS). The court m ust be able to
review the environm ental record presented and be able to conclude that the
agency m ade a "good faith effort" to m eet the goals of NEPA. Second, the EIS
m ust present a full record of environm ental effects of the specific project for
public information. Finally, the EIS m ust present "reasoned analysis" regarding
conflicting data or opinions.
The court concluded that the EIS had been completed in "good faith
objectivity." Satisfactory information had been included in the EIS for the court
to determ ine that while not exhaustive, the document provided ample
inform ation for its public audience (iticluding Congress and federal agencies).
In response to specific reasoning by the district court, the court of appeals
explained its position. The district court determ ined that the matrices approach
in the EIS w as inadequate to consider the various environmental effects of the
alternatives. The court of appeals disagreed stating that the matrices provided
the m ost inform ation in the m ost readable way—writing out the environmental
effects w ould have taken too m uch time to be reasonable. The district court also
stated that the EIS did not discuss the negative environmental impacts of virgin
Boundary Waters Canoe Area

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

22
tim ber logging. The court of appeals found that a fair am ount of the EIS
discussed logging in virgin timber areas and the related effects. In the case that
virgin timber w ould be cut, the EIS stated that individual environmental
analyses w ould be com pleted for each area. The court also stated that 354,000
acres of the 501,000 acres of rem aining virgin timber are in the protected Interior
Zone of the BWCA.
The discussion of future tim ber sales troubled the court of appeals. The
court found that the plan for future logging was inadequate. The court
determ ined that the EIS w as complete concerning present sales. Environmental
analysis reports (EARs) w ere com pleted for each pending sale. The EIS stated
that EARs w ould be done for any tim ber sale in the BWCA in the future as well.
The court of appeals decided that the Forest Service acted according to NEPA for
pending sales w ith the inclusion of individual sale EARs. However, it continued
a perm anent injunction for future sales until the Forest Service issued a more
complete report in its Superior National Forest Timber M anagement Plan and
accompanying EIS.
Result
The court of appeals reversed the district court's decision on the basis that
the W ilderness Act of 1964 allowed logging in virgin forest areas of the BWCA
and that the environm ental im pact statem ent (EIS) completed for the BWCA was
adequate. The court of appeals did decide that the EIS was inadequate
Boundary Waters Canoe Area
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concerning future logging plans. The court m aintained the perm anent injunction
concerning future logging until the new Timber Management Plan and EIS were
completed.

Boundary Waters Canoe Area
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O ther Cases Referenced
Tudicial review under NEPA—Environmental Defense Fund (EOF) v. Corps
of Engineers (Corps), 470 F. 2d 289,294 (8 * Cir. 1972), cert, denied, 412 U.S. 931,93
S. Ct. 2749,37 L.Ed.2d 160 (1973).
"Detailed statem ents" requirem ents—EOF v. Froehlke, 473 F. 2d 346,351
(8 *^ Cir. 1972); EDF v. Corps, supra, 470 F. 2d at 295; Sierra Club v. Morton, 510 F. 2d
813,820 (5* Cir. 1975); Silva v. Lynn, 482 F. 2d 1282^ 1284 (l^t Cir. 1973); Calvert
Cliffs' Coordinating Committee v. U.S. Atomic Energy Commission, 146 U.S.App.D.C.
33,449 F. 2d 1109,1114 (1971).
Good faith obiectivitv—EDF v. Corps, supra, 470 F. 2d at 296; Iowa Citizens
for Environmental Quality, Inc. (ICEQ) v. Volpe, 487 F. 2d 849,852 (8 ‘h Cir. 1973);
EDF V. Callaway, 497 F. 2d 1340 (8 ‘^ Cir. 1974); Natural Resources Defense Council,
Inc. (NRDC) V. Morton, 148 U.S.App.D.C. 5,458 F. 2d 827,836 (1972); Cape Henry
Bird Club v. Laird, 359 F. Supp. 404,412 (W.D.Va.), affd per curiam, 484 F. 2d 453
(4 * Cir. 1973).
Substantive review—EDF v. Corps, 470 F. 2d at 298; EDF v. Froelhke, supra,
473 F. 2d at 358; Calvert Cliffs' Coordinating Committee v. U.S. Atomic Energy
Commission, supra, 449 F. 2d at 1115; Citizens to Freserve Overton Park v. Volpe, 401
U.S. 402,416,91 S. Ct. 814,28 L.Ed.2d 136 (1971); Kleppe v. Sierra Club, —U.S. —,
—, n.21,96 S. Ct. 2718,2731,49 L.Ed.2d 576 (1976).

Boundary Waters Canoe Area
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Procedural compliance under NEPA—Cape Henry Bird Club v. Laird, supra,
359 F. Supp. at 415; EDF v. Froehlke, supra, 368 F. Supp. at 240; Kleppe v. Sierra
Club, supra, —U.S. at —, 96 S. Ct. 2718.
EIS alternatives—ICEQ v. Volpe, supra, 487 F. 2d at 852; NRDC v. Morton,
supra, 458 F. 2d 834; EDF v. Froehlke, supra, 368 F. Supp. at 240.
Future sales: Kleppe v. Sierra Club, supra, —U.S. at — 96 S. Ct. 2718; Sierra
Club V. Froehlke, supra, 534 F. 2d at 1297.

Boundary Waters Canoe Area
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State o f M innesota by Alexander v. Block
660 F. 2 d 1240 {S^ Cir. 1981)

Case H istory
National Association of Property Owners v. U.S., 499 F. Supp. 1223 (D. Minn.
1980)—judgment affirmed by State of Minnesota by Alexander v. Block, 660 F. 2d 1240
(8 * Cir. 1981)—cert, denied by Minnesota v. Block, 455 U.S. 1007 (U.S. Minn. 1982)
Background
Three suits brought by the National Association of Property Owners
against the United States w ere combined in this opinion: (1) National Association
of Property Owners v. U.S., Civil 5-79-95 (D.Minn.l979), (2) Minnesota v. Bergland,
Civ. 5-79-178/ (3) National Association of Property Owners v. U.S., Civ. 5-80-25.
The Boundary W aters Canoe Area was incorporated as wilderness in the
1964 National W ilderness Preservation System Act (Wilderness Act) w ith the
provision that "nothing in this chapter shall preclude the continuance w ithin the
area of any already established use of motorboats." 16 U.S.C. § 1133(d)(5) (1976).
The plaintiffs challenged the legality of the 1978 Boundary Waters Canoe
Area Wilderness Act (Act). Congress passed the 1978 Act to protect the area's
wilderness environm ent from potential degradation. Included in the new Act
were restrictions on motorized use in the BWCAW. Section 4 restricted
motorboat use (maximum of 10-25 horsepower) except in certain designated
areas and snowmobile use w as restricted to two trails.
Boundary Waters Canoe Area
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Plaintiffs' Identities and Contentions
Case No. 1: National Association of Property Owners; National Park
Inholders Association; Ely-Winton Boundary Waters Conservation Alliance;
Local 4757 United States Steel W orkers of America; Lac La Croix Indian Band;
G reater Virginia Area Chamber of Commerce; Crane Lake Commercial Club;
M innesota A rrow head Association; Ely Chamber of Commerce; Carol M. Fisher;
Border Lakes Association; Crane Lake Voyageur Snowmobile Club, Inc.; Crane
Lake Sportsmen's Club; Ash River N am akan Lake Association; Charlotte Ekroot,
d / b / a W indigo Lodge; Robert J. H andberg, d / b / a Campbell's Cabins and
Trading Post. National Association of Property Owners is based in San Antonio,
Texas. National Parks Inholders Association is based in Tahoe, California. Both
organizations brought this suit as representatives of its members. All other
plaintiffs use the BWCAW or operate businesses on the border of the BWCAW.
State of Minnesota, plaintiff-intervenor.
The plaintiffs in the first case argued that (1) Congress unlawfully
delegated pow er to the Secretary to designate the boundaries of the Boundary
W ater Canoe Area Wilderness; and (2) section 4 of the Act, restricting the use of
snowmobiles and motorboats, discrim inated against disabled persons, violated
the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendm ent, and violated N inth
A m endm ent rights as the disabled need motorized access in order to enjoy the
BWCAW. 499 F. Supp. at 1236.
Boundary Waters Canoe Area
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Case No. 2: State of M innesota by Joseph N. Alexander, its Commissioner
of N atural Resources.
Carl Brown, d / b / a Walleye Bait & Tackle Co.; Viking Cruises, Inc.;
Concerned Citizens of N ortheastern Minnesota; Boundary Waters Landowners
Association, a M innesota non-profit corporation; Koochiching County; City of
South International Falls; Village of Ranier; International Falls Chamber of
Commerce; Minnesota United Snowmobilers Association, Inc.; City of
International Falls, plaintiff-intervenors.
The plaintiffs in the second case argued that the BWCAW Act was
unlawful because the federal governm ent lacked the constitutional authority to
regulate non-federal lands and waters.
Case No. 3: National Association of Property Owners; Ely-Winton
Boundary Waters Conservation Alliance; Range Actioneers, Inc.; Crane Lake
Sportsm en's Club; City of Winton.
In the third case, the plaintiffs argued that the enactment of the BWCAW
Act constituted a significant major federal action so that an environmental
impact statem ent w as required per the National Environmental Policy Act of
1976. 42 U.S.C. §4332(2)(C).
D efendants' Identities and C ontentions
Case No. 1: United States of America; Bob Bergland, Secretary of
A griculture, individually and in his official capacity.
Boundary Waters Canoe Area
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Sierra Club; Friends of the Boundary Waters Wilderness; League of
W om en Voters of Minnesota; Izaak W alton League of America, Inc.; Minnesota
Rovers; W ilderness Inquiry II; M innesota Environmental Control Citizens
Association; Minneapolis Chapter, N ational A udubon Society; St. Paul Chapter,
National A udubon Society; D uluth Chapter, N ational A udubon Society;
M innesota O rnithologists' Union; The Wilderness Society, defendantsintervenors.
Defendants move for sum m ary judgm ent dismissing the plaintiffs' suits
and declaring the BWCAW Act lawful.
Case No. 2: Robert Bergland, individually and as Secretary of Agriculture
of the United States.
Sierra Club; Friends of the Boundary Waters Wilderness; Izaak Walton
League of America, Inc.; The League of W omen Voters of Minnesota, Inc.;
M innesota Rovers; W ilderness Inquiry II; Minnesota Environmental Control
Citizens Association; Minneapolis Chapter, National A udubon Society; St. Paul
Chapter, National A udubon Society; D uluth Chapter, National A udubon Society;
M innesota Ornithologists' Union; The Wilderness Society; defendantintervenors.
Defendants m ove for sum m ary judgm ent dismissing the plaintiffs' suits
and declaring the BWCAW Act lawful.
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Case No. 3: Bob Bergland, Individually and in his official capacity as
Secretary of Agriculture; R. Max Peterson, individually and in his official
capacity as Chief of the United States Forest Service.
Sierra Club; Friends of the Boundary Waters Wilderness; League of
W omen Voters of Minnesota; Izaak Walton League of America, Inc.; Minnesota
Rovers; W ilderness Inquiry II; M innesota Environmental Control Citizens
Association; M inneapolis Chapter, National A udubon Society; St. Paul Chapter,
National A udubon Society; D uluth Chapter, National Audubon Society;
M innesota O rnithologists' Union; The Wilderness Society; defendantsintervenors.
Defendants m oved for summ ary judgm ent dismissing the plaintiffs' suits
and declaring the BWCAW Act lawful.
Case No. 1 Issues
(1) Did Congress unlawfully delegate authority to the Secretary of
Agriculture to draw the boundaries of the new Wilderness Area?
(2) Does the Act, by limiting m otorboat and snowmobile use in the
Wilderness, discriminate, unconstitutionally, against the class of all handicapped
persons and the class of all persons less physically fit?
Case No. 2 Issue
(1) Was Congress authorized to regulate non-federal lands and waters?

Boundary Waters Canoe Area
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Case No. 3 Issue
(1)

Did the execution of the 1978 Boundary Waters Canoe Area

W ilderness Act constitute a significant major federal action requiring an
environm ental impact statem ent (EIS) under the National Environmental Policy
Act?
C ourt's H oldings Case No. 1
O n the designation of the boundaries of the BWCAW: The court held that
Congress did not delegate illegal authority to the Secretary. Rather, Congress
designated the boundaries of the BWCAW, not the Secretary. Congress did
require the Secretary to publish a description and m ap of the boundaries in the
Federal Register.
O n the question of the Act's discrimination tow ards disabled persons:
The court held that the Boundary Waters Canoe Area Wilderness Act did not
discriminate against disabled persons in restricting snowmobile and motorboat
use in the wilderness.
The N inth A m endm ent claim by the plaintiffs w as unfounded as the
N inth Am endm ent only protects "fundamental rights." "Fundamental rights"
have been construed strictly by the courts and include the right to interstate
travel, the right to procreate, the right to choose a safe m ethod of contraception,
the right to marry, and the right to child-rearing and education. The present
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issue of m otorized access to the wilderness did not constitute a fundamental
right in the view of the court.
Furthermore, the court held that the Act was not subject to review on the
issue of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendm ent which requires judicial
review only if the plaintiffs "fundam ental rights" were abused. As stated above,
the issue of m otorized access by the disabled did not qualify as a "fundamental
right."
C o u rf s H oldings Case No. 2
On the authority of Congress to regulate non-federal lands and w aters:
The court held that Congress was authorized by the Constitution's Property
Clause to regulate non-federal lands and waters. The Property Clause states that:
"The Congress shall have the Power to dispose of and make all needful Rules
and Regulations respecting the Territory or other Property belonging to the
U nited States

" U.S. Constitution, Article IV, § 3, cl. 2. To m aintain the

wilderness quality of the Boundary Waters Canoe Area Wilderness, Congress
chose to regulate m otorized use m the area. Therefore, the motorized regulation
w as in keeping w ith the Property Clause for certain for federal land.
The court referred to precedents in which the Supreme Court held that the
Property Clause could be extended to state- or privately-owned lands. See Kleppe
V.

New Mexico, 426 U.S. 529,536,96 S. Ct. 2285,2290,49 L.Ed. 2d 34 (1976). In

Kleppe, the court found that Congress could regulate non-federal lands if the
Boundary Waters Canoe Area

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

33
regulations were necessary to protect public lands. The decision was expanded
in United States v. Brown, 552 F. 2d 817 (8 * Cir. 1977), to include non-federally
ow ned w aters as long as the regulations were to protect the public lands or
w aters.
The court held that as long as the Congress's regulations were reasonable,
it could, according to the Constitution, regulate non-federal lands and waters.
Since the purpose of the Boundary Waters Canoe Area Wilderness is to protect
the wilderness quality of the area, the court found that regulations on motorized
access w ere reasonable.
Court's Holdings Case No. 3
O n w hether the 1978 Act constituted a significant major federal action:
The court held that the N ational Environmental Policy Act did not apply to the
enactm ent of the Boundary Waters Canoe Area Wilderness Act of 1978.
Therefore, the action was not a significant major federal action and an
environm ental impact statem ent (EIS) was not required.
First, the court noted that the main purpose of an EIS is to help the federal
agency involved to make an appropriate decision on an agency project. In the
BWCAW Act case, the Congress wrote and passed the Act congressionally—it
w as not an agency decision. Therefore, while the Secretary m ust enforce the
congressional Act, he had no ability to change it. As a result, preparation of an
EIS w as not applicable.
Boundary Waters Canoe Area
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Furtherm ore, the Flint Ridge Doctrine (Flint Ridge Development Co. v. Scenic
Rivers Ass'n, 426 U.S. 776,96 S. Ct. 2430,49 L.Ed. 2d 205 (1976)), explained that
EIS requirem ents and NEPA are superceded by other specific statute mandates.
For example, the BWCAW Act states that it was to be implemented by January 1,
1979. For the court to order an EIS w ould delay the implementation date and
thereby conflict w ith the statutory m andate of the BWCAW Act.
Result
In all three cases, the defendants' and defendant-intervenors' motions for
sum m ary judgm ent were granted. The plaintiffs' motions for summ ary
judgm ent was denied. The BWCAW Act was declared lawful.
Case No. 1, O ther Cases Referenced
Review of congressional act—Chacon v. Granata, 515 F. 2d 922,925 (5‘*' Cir.
1975), cert, denied, 423 U.S. 930,96 S. Ct. 279,46 L.Ed. 2d 258 (1975).
Congressional authority to designate wilderness boundaries—Panama
Refining Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388,55 S. Ct. 241, 79 L.Ed. 446 (1935); Schechter
Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495,55 S. Ct. 837,79 L.Ed. 1570 (1935);
Yakus

V.

United States, 321 U.S. 414,64 S. Ct. 660,88 L.Ed. 834 (1944); Amalgamated

Meat Cutters & Butcher Workmen v. Connally, 337 F. Supp. 737 (D.D.C.1971); Kent
V.

Dulles, 357 U.S. 116,78 S. Ct. 1113,2 L.Ed. 2d 1204 (1958); Shuttlesworth v.

Birmingham, 394 U.S. 147,151,89 S. Ct. 935,938,22 L.Ed. 2d 162 (1969); Hander v.
San Jacinto Junior College, 325 F. Supp. 1019 (S.D.Tex.l971).
Boundary Waters Canoe Area
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Congressional constitutional authority to regulate wilderness—Izaak
Walton League v. St. Clair, 353 F. Supp. 698,710 (D.Minn.l973), rev'd on other
grounds, 497 F. 2d 849 (8 * Cir. 1974); Parker v. United States, 309 F. Supp. 593,59798 (D.Colo.1970), a f d 448 F. 2d 793,795-96 (lO^h Cir. 1971), cert, denied, 405 U.S.
989,92 S. Ct. 1252,31 L.Ed. 2d 455 (1972); McMichael v. United States, 355 F. 2d
283,286 (9 *h Cir. 1965); Gregg v. United States, 290 F. Supp. 706,707-08
(W.D.Wash. 1968).
Question of discrimination under BWCAW Act of 1978—Loving v.
Virginia, 388 U.S. 1,11,87 S. Ct. 1817,1823,18 L.Ed. 2d 1010 (1967); Korematsu v.
United States, 323 U.S. 214,216,65 S. Ct. 193,194,98 L.Ed. 194 (1944); Graham v.
Riclmrdson, 403 U.S. 365,371-72,91 S. Ct. 1848,1851-52,29 L.Ed. 2d 534 (1971).
"Suspect classes"—Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330,363-64,92 S. Ct. 995,
1013-14,31 L.Ed. 2d 274 (1972); San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez,
411 U.S. 1,28,93 S. Ct. 1278,1294,36 L.Ed. 2d 16 (1973); Johnson v. Robison, 415
U S. 361,375 n. 14,94 S. Ct. 1160,1169 n. 14,39 L.Ed. 2d 389 (1974); Massachusetts
Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307,313,96 S. Ct. 2562,2566,49 L.Ed. 2d 520
(1976); Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677,686,93 S. Ct. 1764,1770,36 L.Ed. 2d
583 (1973); Carmi v. Metropolitan St, Louis Sewer District, 620 F. 2d 672 at 676 n. 9
(8 * Cir. 1980); Counts v. United States Postal Service, 17 FEF Cases 1161,1164
(N.D.Fla. 1978); Vanko v. Finley, 440 F. Supp. 656,663 n. 14 (N.D.Ohio 1977); Doe
V.

Colautti, 592 F. 2d 740,710-11 (3d Cir. 1979).
Boundary Waters Canoe Area
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"Fimdamental" rights—Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365,371,91 S. Ct.
1848,1851,29 L.Ed. 2d 534 (1971); McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420,425-26,81
S. Ct. 1101,1104-05,6 L.Ed. 2d 393 (1961); State Bd. of Tax Comm'rs v. Jackson, 283
U.S. 527,537,51 S. Ct. 540,543, 75 L.Ed. 1248 (1931); Rast v. Van Deman & Lewis
Co., 240 U.S. 342,357,36 S. Ct. 370,374,60 L.Ed. 679 (1916); Lindsley v. Natural
Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U.S. 61,78-79,31 S. Ct. 337,340-41,55 L.Ed. 369 (1911);
Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618,638,89 S. Ct. 1322,1333,22 L.Ed. 2d 600 (1969);
Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535,541,62 S. Ct. 1110,1113,86 L.Ed. 1655 (1942);
Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438,453-54,92 S. Ct. 1029,1038-39,31 L.Ed. 2d 349
(1972); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1,12,87 S. Ct. 1817,1823,18 L.Ed. 2d 1010
(1967); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510,535,45 S. Ct. 571,573,69 L.Ed. 1070
(1925); San Antonio School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1,29-34,93 S. Ct. 1278,12941297,36 L.Ed. 2d 16 (1973).
N inth A m endm ent—Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479,484,85 S. Ct.
1678,1681,14 L.Ed. 2d 510 (1965); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113,93 S. Ct. 705,35 L.Ed.
2d 147 (1973); Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319,325,58 S. Ct. 149,152,82 L.Ed.
288 (1937).
Fifth A m endm ent—Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319,328,58 S. Ct. 149,
158,82 L.Ed. 288 (1937); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390,43 S. Ct. 625,67 L.Ed.
1042 (1923); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510,45 S. Ct. 571,69 L.Ed. 1070
(1925); Aptheker v. Secretary of State, 378 U.S. 500,84 S. Ct. 1659,12 L.Ed. 2d 992
Boundary Waters Canoe Area
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(1964); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479,85 S. Ct. 1678,14 L.Ed. 2d 510 (1965);
Roe V. Wade, 410 U.S. 113,93 S. Ct. 705,35 L.Ed. 2d 147 (1973).
Reasonable restrictions bv Congress—McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420,
425-26,81 S. Ct. 1101,1104-05,6 L.Ed. 2d 393 (1961); Williamson v. Lee Optical Inc.,
348 U.S. 483,489,75 S. Ct. 461,465,99 L.Ed. 563 (1955); Lindsley v. Natural
Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U.S. 61,78-79,31 S. Ct. 337,340-41,55 L.Ed. 369 (1911).
Takings—fCo/z/ v. United States, 91 U.S. (1 Otto) 367,372,23 L.Ed. 449
(1875); Thompson v. Consolidated Gas Utilities Corp., 300 U.S. 55,78-80,57 S. Ct. 364,
375-76,81 L.Ed. 510 (1937); Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393,413,43 S.
Ct. 158,159,67 L.Ed. 322 (1922); Cf. Tennessee Valley Authority v. Welch, 327 U.S.
546,551,66 S. Ct. 715,717,90 L.Ed. 843 (1946); Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26,3236,75 S. Ct. 98,102-104,99 L.Ed. 27 (1954).
Treaty questions—The Chinese Exclusion Case, 130 U.S. 581,600,9 S. Ct.
623,627,32 L.Ed. 1068 (1889); Whitney v. Robertson, 124 U.S. 190,195,8 S. Ct. 456,
458,31 L.Ed. 386 (1888); Head Money Cases, 112 U.S. 580,599,5 S. Ct. 247,254, 28
L.Ed. 798 (1884); United States v. Postal, 589 F. 2d 862,878-79 n. 25 (5 * Cir. 1979);
Moser v. United States, 341 U.S. 41,45 & n. 9,71 S. Ct. 553,555 & n. 9,95 L.Ed. 729
(1951); Clark v. Allen, 331 U.S. 503,508,67 S. Ct. 1431,1434,91 L.Ed. 1633 (1947);
Diggs

V.

Shultz, 470 F. 2d 461,465-66 & n . 4 (D.C.Cir. 1972).

Standing—Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727,731,92 S. Ct. 1361,1364,31
L.Ed. 2d 636 (1972); Wampler v. Goldschmidt, 486 F. Supp. 1130,1133
Boundary Waters Canoe Area
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(D.Minn.l980); Association of Data Processing Service Org., Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S.
150,152-53,90 S. Ct. 827,829,25 L.Ed. 2d 184 (1970); Rodeway Inns of America, Inc.
V.

Frank, 541 F. 2d 759,763-65 (8 *^ Cir. 1976); Linda R.S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S. 614,

93 S. Ct. 1146,35 L.Ed. 2d 536 (1973); Wheaton v. Hagan, 435 F. Supp. 1134,1148-49
(M.D.N.C.1977); Oyler v. Boles, 368 U.S. 448,456,82 S. Ct. 501,505,7 L.Ed. 2d 446
(1962); United States v. Peskin, 527 F. 2d 71,86 (7 ^^ c ir. 1975 ); United States v. Oaks,
527 F. 2d 937,940 (9*h Cir. 1976); United States v. Berrios, 501 F. 2d 1207,1211 (2d
Cir. 1974).
Case No. 2 , O ther Cases Referenced
Property clause—Camfield v. United States, 167 U.S. 518,525-26,17 S. Ct.
864,865-67,42 L.Ed. 260 (1987); C fH unt v. United States, 278 U S. 96,100,49 S. Ct.
38, 73 L.Ed. 200 (1928); United States v. Brown, 552 F. 2d 817 (8 * Cir. 1977).
Case No. 3, O ther Cases Referenced
Major federal action—South Dakota v. Andrus, 614 F. 2d 1190 (8 ^^ Cir. 1980);
N.A.A.C.P.

V.

Medical Center Inc., 584 F. 2d 619,634 (3d Cir. 1978); Monroe County

Conserv. Council, Inc. v. Volpe, 472 F. 2d 693,697 (2d Cir. 1972); Environmental
Defense Fund Inc. v. Corps of Engineers, 470 F. 2d 289,294 (8 * Cir. 1972), cert,
denied, 412 U.S. 931,93 S. Ct. 2749,37 L.Ed. 2d 160 (1973); Calvert Cliffs'
Coordinating Committee, Inc. v. A.E.C., 449 F. 2d 1109,1114 (D.C.Cir. 1971); Pacific
Legal Foundation v. Quarles, 440 F. Supp. 316,326 (C.D.Cal.l977); Lake Berryessa
Tenants' Council v. United States, 588 F. 2d 267 (9* Cir. 1978).
Boundary W aters Canoe Area
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Flint Ridge Doctrine—Flint Ridge Development Co. v. Scenic Rivers Ass'n,
426 U.S. 776,96 S. Ct. 2430,49 L.Ed. 2d 205 (1976); Alaska v. Carter, 462 F. Supp.
1155,1161 (D.AIaska 1978); Accord Gulf Oil Corp. v. Simon, 502 F. 2d 1154,1156-57
(Temp.Emer.Ct.App.l974); Dry Color Manufacturers' Ass'n v. Department of Labor,
486 F. 2d 98,107-08 (3d Cir. 1973); Atlanta Gas. Light Co. v. Federal Power Comm'n,
476 F. 2d 142,150 (5‘h Cir. 1973).
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Clouser v. Espy
42 F. 3d 1522 (9*h Cir. 1994)

Case H istory
Clouser v. Madigan, 1992 WL 694368 (D. Or. 1992)—decision affirmed by 42 F.
3d 1522 (9 *h Cir. 1994)—cert, denied by Clouser v. Glickman, 515 U.S. 1141 (1995)—
rehearing denied by Clouser v. Glickman, 515 U.S. 1178 (1995).
Background
Three mining claims were at issue, tw o of which were part of the National
W ilderness Preservation System and one of w hich w as part of the Wild and
Scenic Rivers System. The Robert E. mining claim was in the Kalmiopsis
W ilderness in the Siskiyou N ational Forest, Thunderbolt Claim # 2 was in the
N orth Fork John Day W ilderness Area in the Umatilla National Forest, and the
Wilson Placer m ining claim w as on the Illinois River (which is part of the Wild
and Scenic River System) in the Siskiyou National Forest.
This case w as a lawsuit brought against the Departm ent of Agriculture's
Forest Service by three m ining claim holders. The claim holders challenged the
Forest Service's rulings that pack animals were required to access mining claims
rather than m otorized vehicles.
Plaintiffs' Identities and Contentions
Leroy Clouser and Sharon Clouser (OwneiS of Robert E. Mining Claims),
Carl E. Setera, Judith M. Setera, A nthony S. Setera and Lois A. Setera (Owners of
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the Thunderbolt Mining Claims), Gary Hoefler, Don W urster, Cameron
A nderson and Robin Anderson (Owners of the Wilson Mining Claim).
The plaintiffs sought declaratory and injunctive relief to perm it motorized
access to m ining claims on public land.
The plaintiffs contended that: (1) the D epartm ent of Interior had
"exclusive jurisdiction" over m ining claim validity; (2) the Forest Service could
not prohibit motorized transport as a m ethod of access to a claim while the
D epartm ent of Interior was determ ining the claim's validity; (3) the plaintiffs
representing the Thunderbolt Claim #2 argued that the trails they wished to
travel via motorized transport constituted public highways and were therefore
not in the Forest Service's jurisdiction (16 U.S.C.A. § 551); and (4) they claimed
that existing trails w ere "public right-of-ways under Revised Statutes (R.S.) §
2477 and that according to 36 C.F.R. § 228.4(a), the permittees did not need to
subm it a plan of operation if the operations "... will be limited to the use of
vehicles on existing public roads or roads used ... for National Forest purposes."
D efendants' Identities and C ontentions
Mike Espy, Secretary of Agriculture, United States of America; Dale
Robertson, Chief Forester, Forest Service; John Butruille, Regional Forester,
Pacific Northw est Region; Jeff Blackwood, Forest Supervisor, Umatilla National
Forest; Craig Smith Dixon, District Ranger, N orth Fork John Day Ranger District;
Mike Lunn, Forest Supervisor, Siskiyou National Forest; Dermis Holthus, District
Ranger, Illinois Valley Ranger District; Bruce Babbitt, Secretary of the Interior; Cy
Access to Mining Claims
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Jamison, Director of the Bureau of Land Management; D. Dean Bibles, State
Director, O regon State Office.
The district court had granted sum m ary judgm ent to the defendants. The
defendants contended that: (1) as a m atter of law, the Forest Service has the
authority to regulate access to mining claims in wilderness; (2) the Forest Service
has the authority to regulate access while the D epartm ent of Interior is reviewing
claim validity; (3) the Forest Service w as proper in regulating motorized access to
m ining claims; and (4) the Forest Service was correct in stating that trails were
not public right-of-ways.
Case Issues
(1) Does the D epartm ent of Interior or the Departm ent of Agriculture,
through the Forest Service, have jurisdiction and statutory authority over access
to m ining claims in wilderness areas w ithin national forest land?
(2) Does the Forest Service have jurisdiction to prevent motorized access
while the D epartm ent of Interior is assessing the validity of the plaintiffs mining
claim?
(3) Were the Forest Service's rulings preventing the use of motorized
vehicles to access m ining claims in w ilderness areas proper?
(4) Are national forest trails public right-of-ways?

Access to M ining Claims
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C ourt's H oldings
O n jurisdiction and statutory authority: The court held that the Forest
Service has jurisdiction over access to mining claims in wilderness areas,
according to the W ilderness Act of 1964 which states;
»

In any case w here valid m ining claims or other valid occupancies
are wholly w ithin a designated national forest wilderness area, the
Secretary of Agriculture shall by reasonable regulations consistent
w ith the preservation of the area as wilderness, perm it ingress and
egress to such surrounded areas by means which have been or are
being customarily enjoyed w ith respect to other such areas
similarly situated. 16 U.S.C. § 1134(b).
In the Wilson claim, the W ilderness Act does not apply. However, the
Forest Service m aintains statutory authority to regulate mining claim access
through the Organic A dm inistration Act of 1897. Therefore, even though the
Wilson claim is part of the National Wild and Scenic River System, the Forest
Service has statutory authority to regulate mining claim access.^
O n Forest Service m otorized access restrictions while Interior considered
claim: The court determ ined that changes in motorized access are authorized
under the W ilderness Act, 16 U.S.C. § 1134(b), and the Forest Service's own
regulations at 36 C.F.R. § 228.15. The plaintiffs referred to 43 C.F.R. § 4.21(a)
w hich applies to the D epartm ent of Interior stating that "a decision will not be
effective during the time in w hich a person adversely affected may file a notice of
a p p e a l...." The court determ ined that, legally, the Department of Interior and

Access to Mining Claims
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the D epartm ent of Agriculture could take different positions on the mining
claim.
The Interior departm ent regulation does not purport to instruct
other agencies such as Agriculture about how to treat putative
mining claims during the pendency of appeals in validity
proceedings ... Interior has taken one position. Agriculture another,
and we see no reason why such a divergence is impermissible as a
m atter of law. 42 F. 3d 1522 (9‘^ Cir.1994).
Moreover, the Forest Service ruled in a timely manner on the plaintiffs' plan of
operation—it modified the plan to exclude m otorized access, using its authority
under 36 C.F.R. § 228.5(a).
On the Forest Service rulings preventing motorized access to mining
claims: The court upheld the Forest Service rulings that the plaintiffs could not
access mining claims via motorized transport. The court supported the Forest
Service's rulings that the trails were not public highways and that motorized
access w as not "essential" to the operation of the claims nor "customarily used
w ith respect to other such claims." See 36 C.F.R. §§ 228.15(b) and (c).
On w hether trails were public "right of w ays": The court held that the
trails in question, w hich had been closed to traffic for ten years and were
returning to their natural state, did not constitute public right-of-ways.^

' H owever, the court found that the W ilson claim plaintiffs failed to exhaust their
administrative remedies before seeking judicial review. A s a result, those plaintiffs’
claim s were dismissed.
^ The court further held that plaintiffs’ takings claim could not be used in district
court as miners were seeking equitable relief from the Forest Service’s denial o f
motorized access. Rather, miners would need to seek m oney damages under Tucker A ct
in Court o f Federal Claims. U .S.C .A . Const. Amend. 5; 28 U.S.C .A . § 1346(a)(2).
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R esult
The court held that the Forest Service was correct in prohibiting motorized
access to mining claims.
O ther Cases Referenced
Standard of review—United States v. City of Spokane, 918 F. 2d 84,86 (9 *^
Cir. 1990), cert, denied, 501 U.S. 1250, 111 S. Ct. 2888.
Forest Service authority to regulate—United States v. Weiss, 642 F. 2d 296,
298 (9‘h Cir. 1981); United States v. Richardson, 599 F. 2d 290 (9 * Cir. 1979), cert,
denied, 444 U.S. 1014[, 100 S. Ct. 663] (1980); United States v, Coldfield Deep Mines
Co., 644 F. 2d 1307,1309 (9 * Cir. 1981), cert, denied, 455 U.S. 907,102 S. Ct. 1252;
United States v. Doremus, 888 F. 2d 630,632 (9 *^ Cir. 1989), cert, denied, 498 U.S.
1046, 111 S. Ct. 751.
Exhaustion requirem ents under the Administrative Procedures Act—
Darby v. Cisneros, —U.S. —, —, 113 S. Ct. 2539,2548 (1993); Franklin v.
Massachusetts, —U.S. —, 112 S. Ct. 2767 (1992); El Rescate Legal Serv. v. EOIR, 959
F. 2d 742 (9*h Cir. 1992).
G rounds on which plaintiffs challenge Forest Service rulings—United
States

V.

Barrows, 404 F. 2d 749 (9 * Cir. 1968), cert, denied, 394 U.S. 974, 89 S. Ct.

1468 (1969); Adams v. Witmer, 271 F. 2d 29,33 (9* Cir. 1958); Marsh v. Oregon
Natural Resources Council, 490 U.S. 360,378[, 109 S. Ct. 1851,1861 (1989); United
States V. Vogler, 859 F. 2d 638 (9* Cir. 1988), cert, denied, 488 U.S. 1006,109 S. Ct.
787 (1989).
Access to Mining Claims
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Takings claim—Larson v. Domestic & Foreign Commerce Corp., 337 U.S. 682,
697 n. 18[, 69 S. Ct. 1457,1465 n. 18](1949); Hurley v. Kinkaid, 285 U.S. 9 5 ,104[, 52
S. Ct. 267,269] (1932); United States-v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256,267[, 66 S. Ct. 1062,
1068] (1946); Yearsley v. Ross Construction Co., 309 U.S. 18,60 S. Ct. 413,414,
(1940); Ruckleshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986,1016-17,104 S. Ct. 2862,2879-80
(1984).
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Stupak-Thrall v. United States
843 F. Supp. 327 (W.D. Mich. 1994)

Case H istory
843 F. Supp. 327 (W.D. Mich. 1994)-~affirmed by 70 F. 3d 881 (6 * Cir.
1995)—rehearing En Banc granted, opinion vacated by 81 F. 3d 651—AND on
rehearing En Banc 89 F. 3d 1269—cert, denied by 519 U.S. 1090.
Background
The Sylvania W ilderness in the O ttawa National Forest is part of the
N ational W ilderness Preservation System. The plaintiffs, w ho owned land along
the shore of Crooked Lake, shared surface rights of the lake w ith the federal
governm ent since 90 percent of the lake falls w ithin the Sylvania Wilderness.
The Forest Service am ended the O ttaw a N ational Forest Land and Resource
M anagem ent Plan w ith the contested Am endm ent No. 1. Amendment No. 1
prohibited the use of houseboats and sailboats on Crooked Lake in the Sylvania
W ilderness Area in Michigan's U pper Peninsula and restricted the use of
"electronic fish-finders, boom-boxes, and other mechanical or battery-operated
devices." 843 F. Supp. at 327.
P laintiffs' Identities and C ontentions
Kathy Stupak-Thrall, Michael A. Gajewski, and Bodil Gajewski, PlaintiffsAppellants. The three plaintiffs ow n and operate businesses on the shore of
Crooked Lake.
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Plaintiffs argued that (1) the Forest Service acted outside its statutory
authority and that (2 ) its actions were unconstitutional w hen it issued
A m endm ent No. 1 to its land and resource m anagem ent plan for the Sylvania
W ilderness Area.
Defendants' Identities and Contentions
United States of America and Daniel R. Glickman, Secretary of
Agriculture, individually and in his official capacity, defendants-appellees.
The defendants claimed that the A m endm ent was within statutory and
constitutional pow er of the federal government.
Case Issues
(1 ) Does Congress have the authority to regulate riparian rights of private
citizens?
(2) Does M ichigan's "reasonable use" doctrine apply to the federal
goverm nent's sovereign pow er to regulate waters.
Court's Holdings
On Congress's authority to regulate the riparian rights of private citizen's:
The court found that Congress had the pow er to regulate private riparian rights
of citizens w ho lived along the edge of the lake.
The Property Clause of the Constitution, Article IV, § 3, cl. 2, perm its
Congress to prom ulgate rules and regulations to protect federal property. The
Constitution states: "Congress shall have the Power to dispose of and make all
needful Rules and Regulations respecting the Territory or other Property
Riparian Rights
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belonging to the United States." In the present situation, the court held that
Congress's authority included the regulation of private property when it is
w ithin the best interest of federal property. The court referred to Supreme Court
cases Camfield v. United States, 167 U.S. 518,17 S. Ct. 864,42 L.Ed. 260 (1987);
United States v. Alford, 274 U.S. 264,266,47 S. Ct. 597,598,71 L.Ed. 1040 (1927);
and Kleppe v. New Mexico, 426 U.S. 529,538,96 S. Ct. 2285,2290,49 L.Ed. 2d 34
(1976).
The court referred to precedents, U.S. v. Brown and Minnesota v. Block, in
which the courts relied on Kleppe and Camfield to determine that (1) Congress had
the pow er to regulate state-owned w aters w ithin the boundaries of a national
park; and (2) that Congress had the pow er to restrict motorboat usage on stateow ned w aters w ithin federal wilderness. United States v. Brown, 552 F. 2d 817 (8 “^
Cir. 1977), cert, denied, 431 U.S. 949,97 S. Ct. 2666,53 L.Ed. 2d 266 (1977).
Minnesota v. Block, 660 F. 2d 1240 (8 *^ Cir. 1981), cert, denied, 455 U.S. 1007,102 S.
Ct. 1645,71 L.Ed. 2d 876 (1982).
On the application of M ichigan's "reasonable use" doctrine to the
prom ulgation of A m endm ent No. I 's regulation of private riparian rights: The
court held that M ichigan's "reasonable use" doctrine applied to the regulation of
Crooked Lake. In order to determ ine w hether the restrictions under A m endm ent
No. 1 w ere permissible, the court had to decide w hether the Amendment fell
under the "reasonable use" doctrine.

Riparian Rights
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Michigan's "reasonable use" doctrine separates riparian rights into two
catagories: natural and artificial. "N atural purposes" include "those absolutely
necessary for the existence of the riparian proprietor." "Artificial purposes"
include "those which merely increase one's comfort and prosperity." Thompson
V.

Enz, 379 Mich. 667,154 N.W. 2d 473,483-84 (1967). The court found that the

restrictions placed on the private citizens' riparian rights by A mendment No. 1
were reasonable considering the greater purpose of protecting the surrounding
wilderness area. U nder M ichigan's "reasonable use" doctrine, the Forest Service
was not infringing on the natural riparian rights of the plaintiffs so that the
Forest Service's restrictions w ere not unreasonable.
The M ichigan W ilderness Act (MWA) states that management of the
Sylvania Wilderness Area m ust correspond w ith the conditions of the national
W ilderness Act of 1964. The national W ilderness Act requires each wilderness
area to be preserved according to its w ilderness character. Therefore
A m endm ent No. 1 provided reasonable restrictions. The court decided that the
Forest Service was fulfilling its role in preserving the wilderness character of the
Sylvania W ilderness according to the W ilderness Act.
R esult
The district court granted the defendant's motions for summ ary judgment
and denied the plaintiffs' motions for sum m ary judgm ent and declared the
am endm ent lawful.
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O ther Cases Referenced
Riparian rights— Hall v. Wantz, 336 Mich. 112,116,57 N.W. 2d 462,464
(1953); Burt v. Munger, 314 Mich. 659,661,23 N.W. 2d 117,119-20 (1946).
Standard of review—Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n v. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins.
Co., 463 U.S. 29,41,103 S.Ct. 2856,2865, 77 L.Ed. 2d 443 (1983); Chevron, U.S.A.,
Inc.

V.

Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837,842-43,104 S.Ct. 2778,

2781-82,81 L.Ed. 2d 694 (1984); Borlem S.A.-Empreedimentos Industrials v. United
States, 913 F. 2d 933,937 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (citing Social Sec. Bd. v. Nierotko, 327 U.S.
358,369,66 S. Ct. 637,643,90 L.Ed. 718 (1946)); Rydeen v. Quigg, 748 F. Supp. 900,
905 (D.D.C. 1990), a ff d, 937 F. 2d 623 (D.C. Cir. 1991), cert, denied, 502 U.S. 1075,
112 S. Ct. 974,117 L.Ed. 2d 138 (1992).
Valid existing rights— United States v. Underhill, 813 F. 2d 105, 111 (6 * Cir.
1987) (citing Griffin v. Oceanic Contractors, Inc., 458 U.S. 564,570,102 S. Ct. 3245,
3249,73 L.Ed. 2d 973 (1982), cert, denied, 482 U.S. 906,107 S. Ct. 2484,96 L.Ed. 2d
376 (1987).
Regulation under police pow ers: Square Lake Hills Condominium Ass'n v.
Bloomfield Tzvp., 437 Mich. 310, 322,471 N.W. 2d 321,326 (1991), reh'g denied, 437
Mich. 1280,472 N.W. 2d 287 (1991); Miller v. Fabius Township Bd., St. Joseph
County, 366 Mich. 250,258-60,114 N.W. 2d 205,209-10 (1962); Kleppe v. New
Mexico, 426 U.S. 529,96 S. Ct. 2285,49 L. Ed. 2d 34 (1976); Camfield v. United
States, 167 U.S. 518,17 S. Ct. 864,42 L. Ed. 260 (1987); United States v. Lindsey, 595
F. 2d 5 (9* Cir. 1979); United States v. Brown, 552 F. 2d 817 (1977), cert, denied, 431
Riparian Rights
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U.S. 949,97 S. Ct. 2666,53 L. Ed. 2d 266 (1977); Minnesota by Alexander v. Block,
660 F. 2d 1240 (8 * Cir. 1981), cert, denied, 455 U.S. 1007,102 S. Ct. 1645,71 L. Ed.
2d 876 (1982).
Reasonable use: Thompson v. Enz, 379 Mich. 667,687,154 N.W. 2d 473,484
(1967); Pierce v. Riley, 35 Mich. App. 122,192 N. W. 2d 366 (1971); Kleppe v. New
Mexico, 426 U.S. at 540,96 S. Ct. at 2292.
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Stupak-Thrall v. Glickman
988 F. Supp. 1055 (W.D. Mich. 1997)

Background
The plaintiffs ow ned property along the shore of Crooked Lake which lies
w ithin the Sylvania W ilderness, which is part of the National Wilderness
Preservation System, in the O ttaw a N ational Forest. The plaintiffs argued that
A m endm ent No. 5 of the O ttaw a N ational Forest Land and Resource
M anagem ent Plan, regulating the use of gas-powered motorboats on parts of
Crooked Lake, w as beyond the authority of the Forest Service.
Plaintiffs' Identities and Contentions
Kathy Stupak-Thrall; Michael A. Gajewski; and Bodil Gajewski, Plaintiffs.
The plaintiffs argued that the Forest Service lacked the authority to
regulate the use of gas-pow ered m otorboats on parts of Crooked Lake in the
Sylvania Wilderness.
Defendants' Identities and Contentions
Daniel Glickman, Secretary of Agriculture; Michael P. Dombeck, Chief of
the U nited States Forest Service; Bob Jacobs, Regional Forester for Region IX of
the United States Forest Service; Phyllis Green, Forest Supervisor of the Ottawa
N ational Forest; and the United States Forest Service; defendants.
The defendants contended that the regulation was within the authority of
the Forest Service.
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Case Issues
(1) Did earlier litigation bar this case from being heard?
(2) Did the plaintiffs have a valid existing right in the use of motorboats
on Crooked Lake?
(3) Did the Forest Service have the authority to "promulgate rule
preventing use of gas-powered m otorboats" inside the Sylvania Wilderness?
(4) Did A m endm ent No. 5 to the Forest Service's Land and Resource
M anagem ent Plan constitute a "taking" of personal property under the Fifth
A m endm ent of the Constitution?
C ourt's H oldings
On w hether earlier case barred the hearing of present suit: The District
court held that earlier litigation (see sum m ary for Stupak-Thrall v. U.S., 843 F.
Supp. 327) did not exclude the present case from being heard.
The plaintiffs had brought a case against the United States concerning
A m endm ent No. 1 to the O ttaw a N ational Forest Land and Resource
M anagem ent Plan. In the earlier litigation, the court held that the Forest
Service's am endm ent regulating use of sailboats and electronic items (ex.
boomboxes) w as reasonable and w ithin the authority of the Forest Service. The
defendants argued that the present issue (of the Forest Service's authority to
prom ulgate regulations governing Crooked Lake) was resolved in earlier
litigation. See Stupak-Thrall v. U.S., 843 F. Supp. 327 (W.D. Mich. 1994) (Quist, J.),
a fd , 70 F. 3d 881 (6‘h Cir. 1995), vacated, 81 F. 3d 651 (6* Cir. 1996), a f d by an
Riparian Rights
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equally divided en banc court, 89 F. 3d 1269 (6* Cir. 1996), cert denied,—U.S. —, 117
S. Ct. 674,136 L.Ed. 2d 711 (1997).
In the present case, the district court decided that the plaintiffs' arguments
w ere different enough from the earlier litigation so that they were legitimate
issues before the court. As m otorboat use w as not discussed in Stupak-Thrall I,
and the defendants' have used motorboats actively in the past as an existing
right, the court decided that the issue could be heard in court.i
O n w hether the plaintiffs' use of motorboats was a valid existing right:
The court held that the plaintiffs did have a valid existing right regarding the use
of motorboats on Crooked Lake.
The plaintiffs show ed that m otorboat use had been an established use on
Crooked Lake and that it w as vital for their businesses. Stupak-Thrall showed
that motorboat use w as im portant for her livelihood through her rental business
and had been for years. Hence, m otorboat use was a valid existing right for
Stupak-Thrall on Crooked Lake. Michael and Bodil Gajewski showed that
m otorboat use and rentals w ere crucial for their business's success. The Court
found that m otorboat use w as a valid existing right for the Gajewskis as well.
On w hether the Forest Service has the authority to promulgate
A m endm ent No. 5 which regulated m otorboat use on Crooked Lake: The court

’ The plaintiffs included a challenge to the snowm obile restrictions under
A m endm ent No. 1 in their suit. The court stated that any Amendment No. 1 claims
should have been raised in the earlier case and that it was no longer ripe.
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held that the Forest Service was unauthorized to pass Am endm ent No. 5 in the
O ttaw a N ational Forest Land and Resource M anagement Plan.
The court found that the N ational W ilderness Act of 1964,16 U.S.C. § 1131
et seq., allowed the Secretary of Agriculture to restrict established uses of
m otorboats in wilderness areas as the Secretary found necessary. "Within
wilderness areas designated by this chapter the use of aircraft or motorboats,
w here the uses have already become established, m ay be perm itted to continue
subject to such restrictions as the Secretary of Agriculture deems desirable." 16
U.S.C. § 1133(d)(1). However, the court continued its consideration by pointing
out that the Michigan W ilderness Act of 1987 (MWA), Fub.L. No. 100-184,101
Stat. 1274, limited the Forest Servicers authority w ith special language not in the
N ational Wilderness Act. Specifically, the MWA includes: "wilderness areas ...
are to be m anaged 'in accordance w ith the provisions of the Wilderness Act of
1964,' that managem ent is '[sjubject to valid existing rights.'" 988 F.Supp. at
1062.
On w hether A m endm ent No. 5 constituted a "taking": The court held that
A m endm ent No. 5 did constitute a "taking" of private property w ithout just
com pensation under the Fifth A m endm ent of the Constitution. Because the
plaintiffs used motorboats as p art of their family business, the court found that
the restriction w ould negatively affect their businesses. Therefore, the
governm ent ought to have com pensated the plaintiffs for their anticipated loss in
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business earnings as a result of the m otorboat restrictions found in Amendm ent
No. 5.
Result
The court found that m otorboat restrictions on Crooked Lake constituted
an unlawful act by the Forest Service and a taking under the Fifth Amendment.
However, the ruling applied only to Crooked Lake that has the unique
situation of private citizens inhabiting its shoreline which depend on motorboat
access for business.
The court granted plaintiffs' motion for sum m ary judgm ent and denied
defendants' m otion for sum m ary judgm ent. Finally, Amendm ent No. 5 was
declared null and void in that it was beyond the authority of the Forest Service as
granted by the MWA.
O ther Cases Referenced
Question of w hether issue w as previouslv litigated—Stupak-Thrall v.
United States, 843 F.Supp. 327 (W.D. Mich.1994) (Quist, J.), a fd , 70 F. 3d 881 (6‘h
Cir.1995), vacated, 81 F. 3d 651 (6* Cir.1996), aff'd by an equally divided en banc
court, 89 F. 3d 1269 (6‘h Cir.1996), cert denied, —U.S. —, 117 S. Ct. 764,136 L.Ed. 2d
711 (1997); Drummond v. Comm'r of Social Sec., 126 F. 3d 837,840 (6* Cir.1997);
Heylinger v. State Univ. & Comm. College Sys., 126 F. 3d 849,852 (6“»Cir.1997)
(quoting Barnes v. McDowell, 848 F. 2d 725,728 n. 5 (6* Cir.1988) cert, denied, 488
U.S. 1007,109 S. Ct. 789,102 L.Ed. 2d 780 (1989)); Id (quoting Migra v. Y^arren City
School Dist. Bd. ofEduc., 465 U.S. 75,77 n. 1,104 S. Ct. 892,894 n. 1,79 L.Ed. 2d 56
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(1984)); Drummond (quoting Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90,94,101 S. Ct. 411,414415,66 L.Ed. 2d 308 (1980)); Sanders Confectionary Products v. Heller Financial, 973
F. 2d 474,480 (6‘^ Cir.1992), cert, denied, 506 U.S. 1079,113 S. Ct. 1046,122 L.Ed.
2d 355 (1993); Central Transport, Inc. v. Four Phase Systems, Inc., 936 F. 2d 256,259
(6‘hCir.l991).
A rbitrary and capricious action bv Forest Service?—Louisiana Public Serv.
Comm'n v. FCC, 476 U.S. 355,374,106 S. Ct. 1890,1901,90 L.Ed. 2d 369 (1986).
"Valid existing rights"—Ha// v. Wantz, 336 Mich. 112,116-17,57 N.W. 2d
462 (1953); Burt v. Munger, 314 Mich. 659,663-64,23 N.W. 2d 117 (1946); Pierce v.
Riley, 81 Mich.App. 39,45, 264 N.W. 2d 110,114 (1978); Thompson v. Enz, 379
Mich. 667,154 N.W. 2d 473,476 (1967).
Statutory construction—United States v. Bazel, 80 F. 3d 1140,1145 (6*
Cir.1996), cert.denied, —U.S. —, 117 S. Ct. 210,136 L.Ed. 2d 145 (1996).
Plain m eaning of statute—Audette v. Sullivan, 19 F. 3d 254,256 (6*
Cir.1994); Connecticut Nat. Bank v. Germain, 503 U.S. 249,253-54,112 S. Ct. 1146,
1149,117 L.Ed. 2d 391 (1992); Id at 254,112 S. Ct. at 1149 (quoting Rubin v. United
States, 449 U.S. 424,430,101 S. Ct. 698,701-02,66 L.Ed. 2d 633 (1981).
Personal property taking—Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S.
1003,1014-15,112 S. Ct. 2886,2892-93,120 L.Ed. 2d 798, 812 (1992) (quoting
Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393,415,43 S. Ct. 158,160,67 L.Ed. 322
(1922)); Agins v. Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255,262,100 S. Ct. 2138,2142,65 L.Ed. 2d 106
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(1980) (citing Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164,179-80,100 S. Ct. 383,39293,62L.Ed. 2d 332 (1979)).
Michigan riparian rights—Peterman v. State Department of Natural Resources, 446
Mich. 177,521 N.W. 2d 499 (1994); Mumaugh v. McCarley, 219 Mich.App. 641,646,
558 N.W. 2d 433,435 (1996); Difronzo v. Village of Port Sanilac, 166 Mich.App. 148,
152,419 N.W. 2d 756 (1988); Id (quoting Hilt v. Weber, 252 Mich. 198,225,233
N.W. 159 (1930).
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M cGratl & R ow ley v. B abbitt
986 F. Supp. 1386 (S.D. Fla. 1997)

Background
This case involved Boca G rande Island, which lies within the Key West
N ational Wildlife Refuge (KWNWR). The KWNWR, established in 1908, is
m anaged by the U nited States Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS). Islands within
the refuge were designated p art of the National Wilderness Preservation System
under the Wildlife Act of 1964. Pub. L. 88-577.
The FWS and State of Florida Departm ent of N atural Resources developed
a new managem ent plan for tw o wildlife refuges, including the KNNWR, in 1992
called the "M anagement Agreem ent for Submerged Land Within the Boundaries
of the Key West and Great H eron N ational Wildlife Refuges." The objectives of
the Plan included protecting Boca Grande Key and its ecosystem.
The plan required perm its for commercial operations within the wildlife
refuges. A perm it application process was designed. Permits would be aw arded
to commercial enterprises whose use w as compatible w ith the purposes of the
refuge.
McGrail and Rowley, Inc. (MRI), were commercial operators, running
passengers via catam aran to Boca G rand Key. The FWS alerted MRI in January
1994 that a perm it was required. MRI applied for a perm it June 23,1994. The
FWS denied its application A ugust 3,1994, stating that MRI's use of the refuge
w as incompatible w ith the purposes of the refuge. MRI continued to carry
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passengers via catam aran to the key w ithout a perm it. In October 1994, MRI
appealed the FWS's decision. FWS responded by not processing the appeal,
claiming, "'an appeal is meaningless' so long as MRI continued to use the refuge
for commercial purposes w ithout a perm it." 986 F. Supp. at 1390. MRI filed suit
against the FWS M arch 10,1995, hoping the court would order the process of
MRI's appeal as well as decide several other issues relating to the commercial
perm it process and operation w ithin the refuge.
The court issued tem porary restraining orders (TROs) March 21,1995.
First, the court forbid the governm ent from seizing any of MRI's boats or from
arresting any of the captains w orking for MRI. Second, the court prohibited MRI
from breaking any federal laws relating to the KWNWR.
After the TROs w ere in place, FWS alerted MRI that it was proceeding
w ith MRI's appeal. O n May 22,1995 the FWS Regional Director upheld the
perm it denial.
Now that the FWS processed MRI's appeal. Count 1 in this suit was moot.
The other issues w ere addressed.
Plaintiff's Identities and C ontentions
McGrail and Rowley, Inc., plaintiff.
McGrail and Rowley ow ned McGrail and Rowley, Inc. (MRI), a business
running catam arans in the w aters off Key West, Florida. MRI filed suit to order
the FWS to file its perm it application appeal and to resolve several issues
concerning the FWS m anagem ent and perm it process, (see below)
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H erbert Pontin, plaintiff.
Pontin, a captain for MRI, was cited for refuge trespass while operating an
individual jet ski. H e challenged the FWS action for citing him with a Notice of
Violation for trespassing in refuge waters.
D efendants' Identities
Bruce Babbitt, Secretary of ^ e United States D epartm ent of the Interior,
and several officials of the United States Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS),
defendants.
The defendants argued that the perm it application process was legitimate
and that the plaintiffs application w as properly denied.
Case Issues
(1) W hat is the extent of judicial review for actions taken by the Fish and
Wildlife Service? If subject to the court's review, w hat is the scope of judicial
review?
(2) Did the FWS act in "bad faith?"
(3) Was the FWS action "arbitrary and capricious?"
(4) Was the FWS Refuge M anual binding on FWS actions?
(5) Did the FWS have authority over state lands and waters?
(6) H ow should refuge boundary violations be resolved?
C ourt's H oldings
O n the extent of judicial review : The court held that the actions of the
FWS w ere reviewable under § 706 of the A dm inistrative Procedure Act. 5 U.S.C.
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§ 701 et seq. Section 706 requires the court to restrict its review to the agency's
adm inistrative record.
The court could expand its review beyond the administrative record
providing it could prove allegations that the FWS acted in "bad faith."
O n w hether the FWS acted in "bad faith": The court held that while the
FWS acted in "bad faith" by refusing to process MRI's appeal, it found that the
agency did not act in "bad faith" in the decision-making process.
O n w hether the agency's actions w ere arbitrary and capricious: The court
held that the agency's decision that MRI's uses were incompatible with the
purposes of the refuge was not arbitrary and capricious. The refuge and
w ilderness w ithin it w ere established to protect wildlife, birds and their habitat.
MRI's business ventures, including frisbee in the shallow w ater on the beach and
kayaking around the shore, were found to have potentially negative impacts on
the sensitive ecosystem of the keys. In reviewing the agency's decision, the court
found that it acted appropriately.
On w hether the FWS M anual w as binding on FWS actions: The court
found that the FWS M anual w as not binding on FWS actions. While the manual
provided guidance to the FWS, the court found no precedents in which manuals
w ere found binding.
On w hether the FWS had the authority to regulate non-federal lands and
w aters: The court held that the FWS had the authority to regulate commercial
use of federal lands including subm erged lands and adjacent state waters. The
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authority was vested in the FWS through the Property Clause of the
Constitution. The Property Clause states "The Congress shall have Power to
dispose of and make all needful Rules and Regulations respecting the Territory
or other Property belonging to the United States . . 9 8 6 F. Supp. at 1394 quoting
The Constitution, Article IV, § 3, cl. 2. In United States v. Lindsey, 595 F. 2d 5,6 (9*
Cir. 1979), the court expanded the federal governm ent's authority to include,
"non-federal land 'w hen reasonably necessary to protect adjacent federal
property or navigable w aters.'" 986 F. Supp. at 1394. Therefore, the court held
that the FWS w as acting w ithin its authority in regulating access to state-owned
waters off Boca G rande Key.
O n how trespass violations should be resolved: The court held that
because the paym ent schedule for refuge trespasses was defective, it could not
decide on the plaintiffs' challenge to agency authority.
A dministrative O rder 89-39, by U nited States District Court for the
Southern District of Florida, established that refuge trespass violations could be
resolved w ith paym ent of fines. The court held that refuge violations were
classified as Petty A violations. Petty B violations, according to Local Rule 88.4
could be resolved w ith paym ents in collateral. The court found that because
refuge trespasses w ere Petty A offenses, the Administrative Order 89-39 was in
violation of Local Rule 88.4 and w as therefore, null and void.
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Result
The court held that the FWS acted appropriately in denying the plaintiffs
perm it application. The court ordered MRI to provide an account of fees and
costs for reimbursement under Equal Access to Justice Act.
O ther Cases Referenced
Administrative Procedure Act—Florida Power & Light Co. v. Lorion, 470
U.S. 729,105 S. Ct. 1598,84 L.Ed. 2d 643 (1985); Organized Fisherman of Florida, Inc.
V. Franklin, 846 F. Supp. 1569,1573 (S.D. Fla. 1994); Camp v. Pitts, 411 U.S. 138,

142,93 S. Ct. 1241,1243,36 L.Ed. 2d 106 (1973); Citizens to Preserve Overton Park,
Inc. V. Volpe, 410 U.S. 402,416,91 S. Ct. 814,823,28 L.Ed. 2d 136 (1971); Bowman
Transp., Inc. v. Arkansas-Best Freight System, 419 U.S. 281,286,95 S. Ct. 438,442,42
L.Ed. 2d 447 (1974).
Enforcement of Specific Refuge M anual Provision—Hamlet v. United
States, 63 F. 3d 1097,1103 (Fed.Cir. 1995); Lumber, Production and Industrial
Workers Log Scalers Local 2058 v. United States, 580 F. Supp. 279 (D.Or.l984);
Western Radio Services Co., Inc. v. Espy, 79 F. 3d 896 (9* Cir. 1996).
Federal A uthority over State-Owned Lands—United States v. Lindsey, 595
F. 2d 5 ,6 (9* Cir. 1979); State of Minnesota by Alexander v. Block, 660 F. 2d 1240 (8*^
Cir. 1981).
Qualified Im m unity—Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800,818,102 S. Ct.
2727,2738,73 L.Ed. 2d 396 (1982).
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A ttorney's Fees—Dow v. Busbee, 684 F. 2d 1375,1379 (11* Cir. 1982);
Iranian Students Ass'n v. Sawyer, 639 F. 2d 1160,1163 (5* Cir. 1981); Martin v.
Heckler, 773 F. 2d 1145,1149 (11* Cir. 1985); Robinson v. Kimbrough, 652 F. 2d 458,
465 (5* Cir. 1981); United States v. 4880 5.E. Dixie Highway, 838 F. 2d 1558,1561
(11* Cir. 1988); Commissioner, Immigration and Naturalization Service v. Jean, 496
U.S. 154,159 n. 7,110 S. Ct. 2316,2319 n. 7,110 L.Ed. 2d 134 (1990); Pierce v.
Underwood, 487 U.S. 552,566,108 S. Ct. 2541,2550,101 L.Ed. 2d 490 (1988); Taylor
Group, Inc. v. Johnson, 919 F. Supp. 1545,1549 (M.D.Ala.l996).
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N ational Audubon Society v. Hodel
606 F. Supp. 825 (D. A laska 1984)

Background
The Secretary of Interior exchanged St. M atthew Island, a wilderness area,
w ithin the Alaska M aritime N ational Wildlife Refuge for lands in two other
wildlife refuges, the Kenai and Yukon Delta National Wildlife Refuges, on
A ugust 10,1983, to several corporations. The corporations. Cook Inlet Region,
Inc., Calista Corp., and Sea Lion Corp., know n as CIRI, were native Alaskan
corporations. After the suits w ere filed, the Secretary defended his actions under
Alaska National Interest Lands Conservation Act (ANILCA). 16 U.S.C. § 3192(h),
The lawsuits w ere brought by plaintiffs concerned about the probable loss
of a treasured wilderness area that provided crucial habitat for wildlife and
birds. CIRI planned to excavate oil and gas from the area, an action which could
dam age the ecosystem of St. M atthew Island. A draft environmental statement
outlined possible plans, including a potential pipeline to St. Matthew Island or
offshore loading w ith facilities to be built on St. M atthew Island.
The Alaska M aritime N ational Wildlife Refuge w as designated for
environm ental protection under ANILCA in 1980. 43 U.S.C. §§ 3101-3233 (1982).
St. M atthew w as designated as w ilderness under the national Wilderness Act, 16
U.S.C.A. § 1131 et seq, on October 23,1970. Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act
(ANSCA), w hich passed in 1971,43 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1628 (1982), was enacted as a
settlem ent concerning Native claims of subsistence use and occupation of

67
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

68

A laskan lands. ANILCA and ANCSA are interrelated in the present case
because some ANCSA provisions w ere incorporated into ANILCA's statutory
framework.
P laintiffs' Identities and Contentions
N ational A udubon Society, Bering Sea Fishermens' Association, Trustees
for Alaska, the W ilderness Society, Defenders of Wildlife, National Wildlife
Refuge Association, Friends of the Earth, N atural Resources Defense Council,
Inc.
In case A83-425, the plaintiffs' sought declaratory and injunctive relief.
First, plaintiffs sought judicial declaration that the Secretary's land exchange was
unlaw ful and invalid, and second, the plaintiffs sought a perm anent injunction
preventing the defendants from completing the proposed plan of activity on St.
M atthew Island.
In case A84-401, the plaintiffs' argued that the defendants' suggested plan
to fill in w etlands w ould require CIRI to have a perm it from the United States
Army Corps of Engineers (Corps).
In case A84-402, the plaintiffs' argued that an Environmental Impact
Statement w as required before the oil and gas exploration project could continue.
D efendants' Identities and C ontentions
Donald P. Hodel, William P. H orn, Robert Jantzen, Keith Schreiner, Cook
Inlet Region, Inc., Calista Corporation, Sea Lion Corporation, Malcolm Baldridge,
John V. Bryne.
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Defendants argued that the Secretary's actions were not subject to judicial
review.
CIRI argued that the land exchange created a private inholding, which
w as not subject to federal restrictions as long as the Regional Director received
construction and operation plans for comment.
Case Issues
(1) Was the Secretary of Interior's decision reviewable by the court?
(2) W hat is the standard of review for the Secretary's decision?
(3) W hat did the court decide on the legality of the land exchange?
C ourt's H oldings
O n w hether the Secretary's decision w as reviewable: The court held that
the Secretary's decision w as reviewable. In rejecting CIRI's claim that the
Secretary's actions w ere unreviewable, the court cited earlier cases in which
agency decisions for the "public interest" were reviewable. N inth Circuit Judge
W right found that judicial review w as precluded only in cases w hen "statutes
are draw n so broadly that in a given case 'there is no law to apply.'" 606 F. Supp.
at 834. See FCC v. W NCN Listeners Guild, 450 U.S. 582,101 S. Ct. 1266,67 L.Ed.
2d 521 (1980), and Keating v. Federal Aviation Administration, 610 F. 2d 611 (9* Cir.
1979).
The court concluded that the Secretary's decision was reviewable under
the requirem ents of § 1302(h) of ANILCA. The court looked at the language of
ANILCA and its specifications directing the Secretary's actions. Under ANILCA,
Land Exchange in Alaska
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the Secretary m ust m eet two requirem ents before a land exchange is approved.
First, the land exchange m ust be '"for the purposes of [ANILCA]." Second, the
land exchange is to be in "the public interest" in the case that the lands involved
are of unequal value. 16 U.S.C. § 3192(h) (1982). Therefore, the court may review
the Secretary's actions to determ ine w hether he fulfilled his statutory duty to
make a final decision in the public's interest.
O n the standard of review for the Secretary's decision: The court held that
the Secretary's actions should be review ed under the "arbitrary and capricious"
standard. Precedents (stated above) determ ined that the Ninth Circuit Court
applied the arbitrary and capricious standard to earlier cases.
The court also held that in reviewing the Secretary's decision, it must limit
itself to the Secretary's factors and consideration thereof, rather than including its
ow n judgm ent. The Secretary's actions w ere explained in two documents. The
Departm ent of Interior's Record of Decision and the Public Interest Determination for
the Proposed Acquisition of Inholdings in Kenai and Yukon Delta National Wildlife
Refuges by Exchange for Lands on St. Matthew Island, Alaska. The Record of
Decision described the docum ents used and referred to in the decision process.
The Public Interest D eterm ination outlined the factors considered in the decision
and the explanations for the final decision m ade by the Secretary. Therefore, the
court considered the Public Interest Determ ination and Record of Decision in
m aking its conclusions about the legality of the St. M atthew Island land
exchange.
Land Exchange in Alaska
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W hat did the court decide about the Secretary's actions: In consideration
of the evidence before the Secretary, the court held that the Secretary's decision
w as an abuse of discretion. While the Secretary had determined that the lands
received in exchange for St. M atthew Island enhanced the national wildlife and
conservation worth, the court decided that the Secretary erred in his judgment.
The Yukon E>elta lands received in the exchange were p u t under a non
developm ent easem ent in the Kokechik Bay. These 8,000 acres were home to
num erous nesting and brood rearing waterfowl. The court decided that while
the land w as enormously valuable, it w as already protected. As part of the Delta
NWR, the area w as under the authority of § 22(g) of ANCSA which states that
"every patent issued by the Secretary pursuant to this chapter—which covers
lands lying w ithin the boundaries of a National Wildlife Refuge on December 18,
1971—shall contain a provision that such lands remain subject to the laws and
regulations governing use and development of such Refuge." 43 U.S.C. § 1621(g)
(1982) (emphasis added).
The land exchange granted the Secretary 1100 acres on Nunivak Island.
The island is p art of the Yukon Delta NWR so that conservation of wildlife is one
of its prim ary purposes. The land is also incorporated in ANCSA as an area in
w hich native activities that are compatible w ith refuge purposes are permitted.
Section 14(h) and § 22(g). 43 U.S.C. § 1613(h) (1982)
The land exchange included 2254 acres of CIRI claims in the Kenai NWR.
Again, these lands w ere largely protected as part of the refuge. Overall, the court
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decided that these lands were already protected from incompatible uses so that
the land exchange did not present a significant benefit to national conservation
values.
Despite these determinations, the court decided that the Secretary's
actions w ere not arbitrary or capricious because the land exchange ensured the
recreational objectives of the refuge.
How ever, the court found that the Secretary's determination that the land
exchange w ould not have a perm anent impact on St. M atthew was incorrect.
(For sum m ary of potential dam age, see 606 F. Supp. at 843-44).
In the Public Interest Determination, the Secretary found the exchanges to
be favorable for wildlife refuge and conservation worth. He also determined that
St. M atthew w ould not suffer long-term environmental damage. Under § 22(g)
of ANCSA and § 304(b) of ANILCA, the Secretary is allowed to perm it activities
on refuges only if they are "compatible" w ith the refuge's purposes. 606 F. Supp.
at 842. The Secretary claimed that the oil development w ould be compatible
w ith the refuge's purpose and that disturbances would be temporary.
In light of the potential long-term environmental damage to St. Matthew
Island, the court determ ined that national conservation objectives would not be
better off from the exchange and that the increased recreational opportunities in
the Kenai and Yukon Delta NWRs did not mitigate the negative impacts of the
land exchange.
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R esult
The prelim inary injunction was granted based on the Secretary's abuse of
discretion. The court declared the land exchange invalid.
O ther Cases Referenced
Standing—Kale v. United States, 489 F. 2d 449,454 (9* Cir. 1973); Raypath,
Inc.

V.

City of Anchorage, 544 F. 2d 1019 (9^^ Cir. 1976); Rowe v. United States, 464 F.

Supp. 1060,1075 (D.Alaska 1979), a jf d in part and rev'd in part, 633 F. 2d 799 (9**^
Cir. 1980), cert, denied, 451 U.S. 970,101 S. Ct. 2047.
Reviewability of Secretary's Decision—Lewis v. Hickel, 427 F. 2d 673 (9*
Cir. 1970), cert denied, 400 U.S. 992,91 S. Ct. 456; National Forest Preservation Group
V.

Butz, 458 F. 2d 408 (9*^ Cir. 1973); FCC v. W NCN Listeners Guild, 450 U.S. 582,

101 S. Ct. 1266; Keating v. Federal Aviation Administration, 610 F. 2d 611 (9* Cir.
1979).
Review of Secretary's Public Interest Determination—Chevron U.S.A., Inc.
V.

NRDC, —U.S.— 104 S. Ct. 2778; NAACP v. FPC, 425 U.S. 662,96 S. Ct. 1806,

Confederated Tribes & Bands v. F.E.R.C., 746 F. 2d 466 (9* Cir. 1984); People of the
Village ofGambell v. Clark, 746 F. 2d 572 (9* Cir. 1984); Environmental Defense Fund
v. Andrus, 596 F. 2d 848 (9‘h Cir. 1979) (citing Lathan v. Volpe, 455 F. 2d 1111 (9*
Cir. 1971)).
Granting injunctive relief—American Motorcyclist Association v. Watt, 714 F.
2d 962 (9* Cir. 1983).
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Sierra Club v. Lyng
663 F. Supp. 556 (D. D.C. 1987)

Case H istory
Case followed tem porary injunction in earlier case. Sierra Club v. Block, 614
F. Supp. 488.
Background
This case w as brought by environmental organizations against the
Secretary of Agriculture (Secretary) concerning a program implemented in
w ilderness areas to control Southern Pine Beetle infestations.
The program concentrated on controlling Southern Pine Beetle
infestations in state and privately-owned lands as well as adjacent wilderness
areas. The w ilderness areas included Caney Creek Wilderness, Ouachita
N ational Forest, Arkansas; Kisatchie Hills W ilderness Area, Kisatchie National
Forest, Louisiana; Black Creek W ilderness Area and Leaf Wilderness Area, De
Soto National Forest, Mississippi.
Following the plaintiffs original complaints, the court preliminarily
enjoined the program in w ilderness areas, except for selective cutting around
w oodpecker colonies, to benefit the woodpeckers, until the Forest Service
completed an environm ental impact statem ent (EIS). Sierra Club v. Block, 614 F.
Supp. 488 (D. D.C. 1985). The plaintiffs raised three concerns over the program.
First, they claimed that the program required an Environmental Impact
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Statement (EIS) according to the N ational Environmental Policy Act (NEFA), 42
U.S.C. §§ 4321-4347 (1982), before it could be implemented. Second, they argued
that the program violated the Endangered Species Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1543
(1982), by possibly causing harm to the endangered Red Cockaded Woodpecker.
Lastly, the plaintiffs claimed that the program , requiring tree-cutting and
chemical-spraying in w ilderness areas, violated Section 2 of the Wilderness Act.
16 u s e . §§ 1131-1136 (1982).
The Forest Service completed the EIS process on March 6,1987, and the
Secretary delivered a Record of Decision on April 6,1987. After the EIS was
completed, the plaintiffs' complaints w ere heard.
The NEPA claim w as settled as the Forest Service completed an EIS. The
ESA claim w as declared moot. The parties agreed the issue was moot as the
plaintiffs could not show that the Forest Service's program constituted a "taking"
under the ESA. 16 U.S.C.A. § 1532(19). The only claim to be heard was the
W ilderness Act claim.
Plaintiffs' Identities and Contentions
The Sierra Club and the W ilderness Society, plaintiffs.
The plaintiffs contended that the Secretary's actions in implementing the
Southern Pine Beetle infestation control plan were unjustified under the
appropriate language of the W ilderness Act. The plaintiffs moved for summary
judgm ent.
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Defendants' Identities and Contentions
Richard E. Lyng, Secretary of Agriculture, et al., defendants.
The defendants contended that the Secretary's actions were reasonable
and w ithin his discretion. The defendants m oved for sum m ary judgment.
Case Issues
(1) W hat statute governed the Secretary's actions?
(2) H ow did the court interpret Section 4(d)(1) of the Wilderness Act
related to the question of w hether cutting along the borders of wilderness areas
w as "necessary"?
(3) Were the Secretary's actions reasonable?
(4) U nder the beetle control program , w ould federally-designated
wilderness areas be sacrificed for private interests?
Court's Holdings
O n w hat statute governed the Secretarv's actions: The court and both
parties agreed that the Secretary's actions were governed by Section 4(d)(1) of the
Wilderness Act. The section allows the Secretary to take "such measures [within
Wilderness Areas] ...a s m ay be necessary in control of fire, insects, and diseases,
subject to such conditions as the Secretary deems desirable." 16 U.S.C. §
1123(d)(1) (1982).
On the court's interpretation of Section 4fd)fiys "necessary" w ording: In
Sierra Club v. Lyng, 662 F. Supp. 40 (D.D.C. 1987), the court held that under the
W ilderness Act, the Secretary had "art affirmative burden of justifying his actions
Insect Control Program
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

77
'by dem onstrating they are necessary to effectively control the threatened harm
that prom pts the action being tak en /" 663 F. Supp. at 558-59 quoting 662 F. Supp.
40.
The plaintiffs interpreted "necessary" to mean that the Secretary needed
scientific proof that the cutting w as necessary before the program could be
implemented.
The court found that the plaintiffs had interpreted "necessary" too
narrowly. Specifically, the court held that "necessary" should be read as the
means "needed to achieve a certain result or effect," a definition according to the
American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language 877 (1981). The court
concluded that:
[t]he pertinent section of the statute is therefore m ost reasonably
construed as allowing the Secretary to use measures that fall short
of full effectiveness so long as they are reasonably designed to
restrain or limit the threatened spread of beetle infestations from
wilderness land into the neighboring property, to its detriment.
663 F. Supp. at 556.
On w hether the Secretary's actions were reasonable: The court held that
the Secretary's actions were reasonable pursuant to Section 10 of the
Administrative Procedure Act. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A)(1982).
Reviewing Forest Service records on beetle infestation control and
relevant scientific opinion, the court found that the Secretary's decisions were
reasonable and not arbitrary or capricious.
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O n w hether w ilderness areas w ould be sacrificed for private land
interests: The court held that wilderness areas w ould not be sacrificed for
private land interests. Rather, the court found that the Secretary had properly
explained that private landowners w ould exert the same am ount of effort as the
Forest Service to control beetle infestation. That said, the court found that the
Secretary had m et his obligations under the W ilderness Act.
Result
The court granted the defendants sum m ary judgm ent on the Wilderness
Act claims. The plaintiffs m otion for sum m ary judgm ent was denied. The ESA
claim w as moot. The NEPA claim was dismissed.
Other Cases Referenced
Earlier Litigation—Sierra Club v. Block, 614 F. Supp. 488 (D.D.C. 1985);
Sierra Club v. Lyng, 622 F. Supp. 40,42 (D.D.C. 1987).
"Necessary" interpretation—Sierra Club v. Lyng, supra; Cf. McCulloch v. Maryland,
17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316,421,4 L.Ed. 579.
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United States v. Gregg
290 F.Supp. 706 (W.D. Wash. 1968)

Background
The defendant w as convicted by the U nited States for landing an airplane
in a federally-designated wilderness area. This case w as presented before the
court on the appeal by the defendant.
P laintiffs Identity and Contentions
The U nited States of America, plaintiff.
The U nited States contended that the defendant w as lawfully and
properly convicted.
Defendant's Identity and Contentions
Vean R. Gregg, defendant.
The defendant claimed that he was unlawfully convicted for landing an
airplane in a National Forest Wilderness. H e claimed that the Wilderness Act
perm itted airplane landings where there was established use. He argued that
landings could continue unless the Secretary of Agriculture banned them and
furtherm ore, that the Secretary did not have the pow er to prohibit landings
altogether. Finally, Gregg argued that the United States could not treat his
landing as a criminal violation as no penalty for wilderness landings was w ritten
inlaw .
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Case Issues
(1) Are aircrafts allowed in national wilderness areas?
(2) W ould an illegal aircraft landing constitute a criminal violation in a
national wilderness area?
C ourt's H oldings
O n w hether aircrafts are allowed in national wilderness areas: The court
held that aircraft landings were outlaw ed in national wilderness areas according
to the W ilderness Act of 1964 and a federal regulation prom ulgated by the
Secretary of Agriculture. 16 U.S.C. § 1133(c), (d)(1). 36 CFR 251.75,16 U.S.C. §
551. Section 1133(c) states,
except as necessaiy to meet m inim um requirements for the
adm inistration of the area for the purpose of this chapter (including
measures required in emergencies involving the health and safety
of persons w ithin the area), there shall be ... no landing of aircraft
... w ithin any such area."

Section 1133(d)(1) states that aircraft landings may be perm itted in areas where
there has been an established use. The court stressed the use of the w ord "may"
rather than "shall" in the section.
After the passage of the W üdem ess Act of 1964, aircraft landings
continued in areas w here previous use w as established. However, aircraft
landings, except w here perm itted in the W ilderness Act, were banned in a
regulation declared by the Secretary of Agriculture. 36 CFR 251.75,16 U.S.C. §
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551. In the regulation, the Secretary granted the Chief of the Forest Service the
pow er to condone landings in cases of need w here prior use was established.
According to these aspects of the W ilderness Act and Code of Federal
Regulations, the court held that aircraft landings were not permitted in
w ilderness areas unless specifically allowed by the Secretary of Agriculture or
Chief of the Forest Service.
On w hether an illegal aircraft landing w ould constitute a criminal
violation: The court held that an illegal aircraft landing in a national wilderness
area did constitute a criminal violation according to 16 U.S.C. § 551 and the
earlier case law in McMichael v. United States, 355 F.2d 283 (9* Cir. 1965). Section
551 states.
The Secretary of A griculture shall make provisions for the
protection against destruction by fire and depredations upon the ...
national forests ... and he may make such rules and regulations ..,
as will insure the objects of such reservations, namely to regulate
their occupancy and use and to preserve the forests thereon from
destruction; and any violation o f ... such rules and regulations shall
be punished by a fine of not more that $500 or imprisonment for
not m ore than six m onths, or both.
The court in McMichael v. United States relied on section 551 to uphold a
conviction in that case in w hich the plaintiffs used motorized vehicles in a
primitive area before the W ilderness Act had been passed. In the present case,
the court decided that section 551 designated infractions of the Wilderness Act as
criminal acts. The W ilderness Act prohibited the plaintiff's landing. Therefore,
the action w as criminal according to section 551.
Airplanes in W ilderness
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Result
The court confirmed the United States Commissioner's decision that the
aircraft landing was a criminal act. The court found that the plaintiff's appeal
w as groundless.
Other Cases Referenced
16 U.S.C. S 551— McMichael v. United States, 355 F.2d 283 (9‘h Cir. 1965).
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Iza a k W alton League o f America v. St. Clair
497 F. 2d 849 (8«» Cir. 1974)
Case H istory
55 F.R.D. 139 (1972)—judgment affirmed by 497 F. 2d 849 (1974)—cerf, denied
fy419U .S. 1009(1974).
Background
This case focused on the m ining rights of defendant, George W. St. Clair,
in the Boundary W aters Canoe Area. In 1969, St. Clair conducted exploratory
w ork in the 150,000 acres of land in which his mining rights lie and determined
that drilling w ould be appropriate in the area. St. Clair did not have a perm it to
conduct the drilling. He alerted the Forest Service of his plan to drill that in turn
notified him that it w as not in favor of the proposed drilling. Throughout the
litigation the Forest Service had not completed the administrative perm it process
for St. Clair.
The Boundary W aters Canoe Area is part of the Superior National Forest
in northern Minnesota. The Superior National Forest (3,000,000 acres) was
protected as a national forest in 1909 by President Theodore Roosevelt. The land
comprising the present day Boundary Waters Canoe Area (1,031,204 acres) was
included in the forest's designation. As p art of the designation. President
Roosevelt found "at least inferentially that the Superior National Forest was
m ore valuable for forest than for mineral." 353 F. Supp. at 703. The Secretary of
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Agriculture established the first roadless area in the Superior National Forest in
1927. After a num ber of roadless areas w ere designated, a regulation was passed
combining them into the Boundary W aters Canoe Area (BWCA) on January 27,
1958.
The national W ilderness Act of 1964,16 U.S.C.A. § 1131 et seq., established
the BWCA as part of the N ational W ilderness Preservation System. The
W ilderness Act allowed m ineral activity for existing rights so long as the
exploration is compatible w ith the w ilderness character of the area. Similarly,
mineral extraction w as perm itted until December 31,1983 so long as the means
of extraction were deem ed appropriate by the Secretary of Agriculture. 16 U.S.C.
§ 1133(d)(2) and (3).
The Secretary of A griculture appointed a BWCA Review Committee in
1964 that m ade recom m endations regarding mining activity in the BWCA. The
committee recom mended that mining not be allowed and that permission
granting mining perm its ought to be revoked. 353 F. Supp. at 706. The Secretary
responded w ith a report saying that "consent of the Departm ent of Agriculture
not be given for m ining and mineral leasing in the Boundary Waters Ccinoe Area,
except in a national em ergency ..." 353 F. Supp. at 706.
Plaintiff's Identity and Contention
Izaak W alton League of America, plaintiff.
The plaintiffs argued that m ining w as banned by the Wilderness Act. In
the appeal, the plaintiffs supported the decision of the District Court.
Mining Claim Rights
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D efendant's Identity and C ontention
George W. St. Clair, a citizen holding mineral rights to 150,000 acres in the
Boundary Waters Canoe Area, appellant.
The appellant argued that m ining w as perm itted in the BWCA according
to federal laws and that the district court erred in its granting of an injunction
against him. Furthermore, St. Clair argued that the district court's decision
constituted a taking of his private property rights.
Robert L. Herbst, Commissioner of Conservation of the State of
Minnesota, appellant.
Herbst, a representative for the state of Minnesota argued that the state
had standing and could make cross-claims in the suit although it w as denied by
the district court.
Earl L. Butz, Secretary of Agriculture, et al., appellants.
Butz represented the federal interests in the case. The federal appellants
argued that the doctrine of prim ary jurisdiction should have been applied to the
present case. It disagreed w ith the district court that mining was disallowed by
the W ilderness Act and claimed that some compatible mining was permitted.
Case Issues
(1) Could the court rule on the plaintiff's claims?
(2 ) Did the district court err in its decision?

Mining Claim Rights
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C ourt's H oldings
On w hether the court could rule on the plaintiff's claims: The court of
appeals held that it could not rule on the plaintiffs claims. The case at hand
involved a legal question (did the W ilderness Act bar the defendant from
mining?) while enforcement of the decision required resolution of the issues at
hand by the adm inistrative process (would the Forest Service grant St. Clair a
permit?).
The court held that the Forest Service had to grant a final decision on St.
Clair's perm it to driU in the BWCA before the court could proceed w ith the
decision.
On w hether the district court erred in its decision: The court of appeals
found that the district court erred in its earlier decision. The court reversed the
district court's decision and rem anded the case w ith instructions that the Forest
Service needed to complete its perm it review before the case was subject to
judicial review.
Result
The case w as reversed and rem anded w ith instructions that the Forest
Service complete perm it process before the case w as subjected to judicial review.
O ther Cases Referenced
Establishment of Roadless Areas— United States v. Perko, 108 F. Supp. 315,
316 (D.Minn.l952), aff'd Perko v. United States, 204 F. 2d 446 (8 * Cir. 1953), cert,
denied 346 U.S. 832, 74 S. Ct. 48,49,98 L.Ed. 355 (1953); see companion cases of
Mining Claim Rights
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United States v. Perko, 8 Cir., 133 F. Supp. 564 (D.Minn.l955); 141 F. Supp. 372
(D.Minn.l956); Bydlon v. United States, 146 Ct.Cl. 764,175 F. Supp. 891 (1959).
Zoning—Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394,36 S. Ct. 143,60 L.Ed. 348
(1915); St. Paul v. Chicago, St. Paul, Mpls. and Omaha Ry., 413 F. 2d 762 (8 *
Cir.1969); Goldblatt v. Town of Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590,593,82 S. Ct. 987,8 L.Ed.
2d 130 (1962); City of Marysville v. Standard Cil Co., 27 F. 2d 478 (8 *^ Cir.1928),
aff'd. Standard OU Co. v. Marysville, 279 U.S. 582,49 S. Ct. 430, 73 L.Ed. 856 (1929);
Kiges V. City of St. Paul, 240 Minn. 522,62 N.W. 2d 363,369-70 (1953); State ex rel.
Beery v. Houghton, 164 Minn. 146,204 N.W. 569,54 A.L.R. 1012 (1925), aff'd mem.,
273 U.S. 671,47 S. Ct. 474,71 L.Ed. 832 (1927), Euclid, Ohio v. Ambler Realty Co.,
272 U.S. 365,395,47 S. Ct. 114,121,71 L.Ed. 303 (1926); Gorieb v. Fox, 274 U.S. 603,
608-609,47 S. Ct. 675,71 L.Ed. 1228 (1927); McMahon v. City of Dubuque, Iowa, 255
F. 2d 154,158-159 (8 *^ Cir.), cert, denied, 358 U.S. 833,79 S. Ct. 53,3 L.Ed. 2d 70
(1958); Naegele Outdoor Adv. Co. v. Village of Minnetonka, 281 Minn. 492,162 N.W.
2d 206,212 (1968); State ex rel. Howard v. Village of Roseville, 244 Minn. 343,70
N.W. 2d 404,407 (1955); South Carolina State H. Dept. v. Barnwell Bros., 303 U.S.
177,191-192,58 S. Ct. 510,82 L.Ed. 734 (1938); Weinberg v. Northern Pac. Ry. Co.,
150 F. 2d 645,648 (8 * Cir. 1945); Naegele Outdoor Adv. Co. v. Village of Minnetonka,
[281 Minn. 492] 162 N.W. 2d at 209; American Wood Products Co. v. City of
Minneapolis, 21 F. 2d 440,444 (D.Minn.l927) Q. Sanborn), aff'd, 35 F. 2d 657 (8 “»
Cir.1929); Kiges v. City of St. Paul, [240 Minn. 522,] 62 N.W. 2d at 369; Berman v.
Parker, 348 U.S. 26,75 S. Ct. 98,99 L.Ed. 27 (1954); Naegele Outdoor Adv. Co. v.
Mining Claim Rights
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Village of Minnetonka, supra. State ex rel Twin City Bldg. & Inv. Co. v. Houghton, 144
Minn. 1 ,174 N.W. 885,176 N.W. 159,162,8 A.L.R. 585 (1920); United States v.
Gregg, 290 F. Supp. 706 (W.D.Wash.l968); McMichael v. United States, 355 F. 2d
283 (9‘h Cir.1965); United States v. Foresyth, 321 F. Supp. 761 (D.Colo.l971); West
Virginia Highlands Conserv. v. Island Greek Coal Co., 441 F. 2d 232 {4*>^ Cir.1971).
Abandonm ent, Laches, Equities— Washburn v. Gregory Co., 125 Minn. 491,
147 N.W. 706 (1914); Wichelman v. Messner, 250 Minn. 88,83 N.W. 2d 800 (1957);
Klass V. Twin City Federal Savings and Loan Ass'n, 291 Minn. 68,190 N.W. 2d 493
(1971); Heywood v. Northern Assurance Co., 133 Minn. 360,158 N.W. 632 (1916).
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O tter Creek Coal Company v. United States
231 Ct.Cl. 878 (1982)

Background
The plaintiff ow ned m ining rights to an area w ithin the Otter Creek
W ilderness Area of the National W ilderness Preservation System. 16 U.S.C. §
1131 et seq. The defendant ow ned the surface rights above the area in question.
Earlier in the litigation, the court determ ined that the plaintiff had to be denied a
perm it application before the court could enter a final decision. The plaintiff
applied to the Secretary of Interior through the Office of Surface Mining &
Reclamation (OSM) and the Secretary of Agriculture through the Forest Service
(USFS).
The court described this situation as a role reversal. The government did
not w ant to deny the perm it as it m ight constitute a taking which was
discouraged by the legislative history of the Surface M ining Control and
Reclamation Act of 1977 (SMCRA). 30 U.S.C. §§ 1201 et seq. The government
claimed the plaintiff w as unw illing to cooperate w ith the government's
guidelines. For example, the governm ent encouraged the plaintiff to pursue a
declaration of "valid existing rights" so that it's mining claim could be granted
under the SMCRA. 30 U.S.C. § 1272(e).
In the two earlier court reports the court decided that no decision could be
m ade until the governm ent m ade a final decision on the plaintiff's application.
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However, after the plaintiff applied to the Secretaries, the Secretaries halted the
decision process as the application w ould have been denied.
Plaintiff's Identity and Contention
Otter Creek Coal Com pany, plaintiff.
The plaintiff pursued this suit arguing that the designation of the
wilderness area constituted a legislative taking of its mining claim. It claimed
that the W ilderness Act of 1964, Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act of
1977, and the Eastern W ilderness Act of 1975 prohibited mining and that it
should be reim bursed for the legislative taking. 16 U.S.C. § 1131 et seq.) 30 U.S.C.
§§ 1201 et seq.; Pub. L. No. 93-622,99 Stat. 2096.
D efendant's Identity an d C ontention
United States of America, defendant.
The U nited States, under the direction of the Surface Mining Control and
Reclamation Act of 1977, w anted to avoid a taking claim in this situation. 30
U.S.C. §§ 1201 et seq.
Case Issues
(1) Could O tter Creek Coal Com pany mine in the O tter Creek Wilderness
Area?
(2) Could O tter Creek Coal C om pany use the "valid existing rights" claim
under the Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act of 1977?
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C ourt's H oldings
On w hether Otter Creek Coal Com pany could mine in the Otter Creek
W ilderness A rea: The court held that if the governm ent could design a plan to
m ine in the O tter Creek Wilderness Area w hich m et all regulations, the Otter
Creek Coal Com pany could coal mine in the wilderness.
On w hether O tter Creek Coal Com pany could claim "valid existing
rights" under SMCRA: The court held that O tter Creek could pursue "valid
existing rights" as the definition of "valid existing rights" was vague.
The plaintiff argued that it could not pursue "valid existing rights" because it did
not pass the "all perm its" test w hich w as p art of the regulation adopted in 1979.
The court disagreed because the regulations had become more permissive as a
means to avoid takings. Therefore, the plaintiff could and should pursue its
"valid existing rights."
R esult
The court affirmed the trial judge's order that encouraged the plaintiff and
defendant to determ ine w hether an agreem ent for coal mining could be reached
m the O tter Creek W ilderness Area.
O ther Cases R eferenced
Surface M ining Control and Reclamation Act—Model v. Virginia Surface
M ining & Reclamation Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264,295-97 (1981); Model v. Indian, 452 U.S.
314,333-35 (1981); Agins v. City ofTiburon, 447 U.S. 255,260-63 (1980); Penn
Central Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
Mining Claim Rights
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"Valid Existing Rights"—Permanent Surface Mining Regulation Litigation,
Civ. No. 79-1144 (D.D.C. Feb. 26,1980), aff'd 653 F. 2d 514, cert, denied; Peabody
Coal Co. V. Watt, 454 U.S. 822 (1981).
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Pacific Legal Foundation v. W a tt
529 F. Supp. 982 (D.M ont. 1981)

Case H istory
529 F. Supp. 982 (D. Mont. 1981)— supplemented by 539 F. Supp. 1194 (D.
Mont. 1982)
Background
The w üdem ess areas at issue included the Bob Marshall, Scapegoat and
Great Bear W ilderness that w ere designated as p art of the National Wilderness
Preservation System under the national W ilderness Act of 1964. 16 U.S.C. § 1131
et seq. (1976). The case concerned mineral activity in the wilderness areas.
Mining w as addressed in the W ilderness Act that stated that mining could
continue until m idnight December 13,1983, after which mining exploration and
leasing w ould cease completely.
The Federal Land Policy and M anagem ent Act of 1976 (FLPMA) includes
a provision for em ergency public land w ithdraw s to be used by the Secretary of
Interior. 43 U.S.C.A. § 1701 et seq. Section 204(e) allows the Secretary to
w ithdraw public lands from m ineral activity if either the Committee on Interior
and Insular Affairs of the House of Representatives or the Committee on Energy
and N atural Resources of the Senate apprises the Secretary that an emergency
situation exists for the public lands.
The House Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs voted 23 to 18 on
May 21,1981, for a resolution stating that an emergency situation existed in the
93
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Bob M arshall Scapegoat and Great Bear W ilderness Areas. The resolution found
that "'extraordinary m easures' m ust be taken 'to preserve values that otherwise
w ould be lost.'" 529 F. Supp. at 986. As a result, the Committee chairman
directed the Secretary of Interior to w ithdraw al lands in the Bob Marshall,
Scapegoat, and G reat Bear W ilderness Areas from mining exploration and
leasing until Jan. 1,1984.
The Secretary w ithdrew the lands under Public Land O rder No. 5952 on
June 1,1981.
Plaintiffs' Identities and Contentions
Pacific Legal Foundation (PLF), et al., plaintiffs.
M ountain States Legal Foundation, plaintiff.
Pacific Legal Foundation and M ountain States Legal Foundation (MSLF)
brought this suit against the Secretary of the United States D epartm ent of the
Interior, James W att, to dispute the w ithdraw al of certain wilderness lands from
mineral activity. The plaintiffs included eight individuals who are members of
the MSLF and six individuals w ho support PLF. All individuals held lease
applications to w ilderness lands w ithin the areas w ithdraw n under Public Land
O rder No. 5952.
Plaintiffs argued that (1) the House instructions to w ithdraw lands under
§ 204(e) violated that Secretary of Agriculture's discretionary control of
determ ining scope and duration of the w ithdraw al, and (2) the House directive
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conflicted w ith § 4(d)(3) of the W ilderness Act w hich perm itted mineral
exploration and leasing activities until Jan. 1 ,1984.
D efendants' Identities and C ontentions
James G. Watt, Secretary of the United States Department of Interior, John
R. Block, Secretary of the United States D epartm ent of Agriculture, defendants.
The Bob M arshall Alliance, the Wilderness Society, and the Sierra Club,
intervening-defendants.
The federal defendants contended that the plaintiffs lacked standing to
sue, but w rote that,
if plaintiffs have standing to sue, the Committee had no statutory
authority to direct the Secretary to w ithdraw the wilderness areas
and the Secretary had no authority to w ithdraw the lands; and ...
that portion of section 204(e) w h id i authorized Committee's
emergency w ithdraw al resolution is unconstitutional for essentially
the same reasons urged by the plaintiffs. 529 F. Supp. at 987.
Case Issues
(1) Did the House directive "impermissibly conflict" with the National
W ilderness Act of 1964?
(2) May a Congressional Committee establish the scope and duration of a
"w ithdraw al" under Section 204(e) of FLPMA of wilderness lands from mineral
and gas leasing?
C ourt's H oldings
On the conflict between the H ouse directive and the Wilderness Act: The
court held that the H ouse's resolution d id conflict w ith the Wilderness Act. The
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resolution prohibited mineral exploration and leasing activities until Jan. 1,1984
w hereas the W ilderness Act perm itted mineral exploration and leasing activities
until Jan. 1,1984. 16 U.S.C.A. § 4(d)(3).
O n Section 204(e) of FLPMA: The court found that the House Committee
did not have the pow er to direct the Secretary to remove public lands under the
Federal Lands Policy and M anagem ent Act (FLPMA) section 204e. Rather,
section 204(e) perm itted the House Committee to recommend a w ithdraw al of
public land in the case of an emergency situation, but the Secretary m ust
determ ine the scope and duration of the w ithdraw al, subject to judicial review.
Finally, the Court found that the Secretary had the pow er to cancel the order to
w ithdraw al lands (after a reasonable am ount of time) made by the House or
Senate Committees on natural resources.
Result
The court ordered the Secretary to revoke Public Land Order No. 5952 and
to determine the scope and duration of the public land w ithdraw al w ithin the
three wilderness areas. The Secretary had, after the original review of the issue
and before this opinion, deferred all gas and oil drilling in all wilderness areas.
O ther Cases Referenced
Standing (Iniurvl— Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Environmental Study Group,
Inc., 438 U.S. 59,79,98 S. Ct. 2620,2633,57 L.Ed. 2d 595 (1978); Chadha v.
Immigration and Naturalization Service, 634 F. 2d 408.415 (9 Cir. 1980), cert, granted,
— U.S. —, 102 S. Ct. 87,70 L.Ed. 2d 80 (1981).
Emergency Land W ithdrawals
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Standing (sufficient concrete interests)—Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 , 12 n.
10,96 S. Ct. 612,631 n.lO, 46 L.Ed. 2d 659 (1976) (per curiam).
Standingl'personal stake)—Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490,498-99,95 S. Ct.
2197,2205,45 L.Ed. 2d 343 (1975).
Standing. "Injured in fact, zone of interests"—United States v. SCRAP, 412
U.S. 669,686,93 S. Ct. 2405, 2415,37 L.Ed. 2d 254 (1973); Sierra Club v. Morton, 405
U.S. 727,733,92 S. Ct. 1361,1365,31 L.Ed. 2d 636 (1972).
Standing related to noncom petitive leases—Burglin v. Morton, 527 F. 2d
486,488 n.2 (9 Cir. 1976), cert, denied, 425 U.S. 973,96 S. Ct. 2171,48 L.Ed. 2d 796
(1976). Arnold v. Morton, 529 F. 2d 1101,1106 (9 Cir. 1976). Schraier v. Hickel, 419
F. 2d 663,667 (D C. Cir. 1969)
. Standing to challenge unlaw ful im pedim ents—Krueger v. Morton, 539 F. 2d
235 (D.C.Cir. 1976); Duesing v. Udall, 350 F. 2d 748 (D.C.Cir. 1965), cert, denied', 383
U.S. 912,86 S. Ct. 888,15 L.Ed. 2d 667 (1966).
"Generalized grievance"— Wart/i v. Seldin, 422 U.S. at 499,95 S. Ct. at 2205;
Duke Power Co., 438 U.S. at 80,98 S. Ct. 2634; Schlesinger v. Reservists Committee to
Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208, 220,94 S. Ct. 2925,2931,41 L.Ed. 2d 706 (1974); Sierra
Club V. Morton, 405 U.S. at 735,92 S. Ct. at 1366; Western Mining Council v. Watt,
643 F. 2d 618,623 (9 Cir. 1981), petition for cert, denied —U.S. —, 102 S. Ct. 567,70
L.Ed. 2d 474 (1981); Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp.,
429 U.S. 252,264,97 S. Ct. 555,563,50 L.Ed. 2d 450 (1977).
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Standing of organizations—Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. at 739,92 S. Ct.
at 1368; Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. at 511,95 S. Ct. at 2211; Hunt v. Washington State
Apple Advertising Commission, 432 U.S. 333,97 S. Ct. 2434,53 L.Ed. 2d 383 (1977);
Legal Aid Society of Alameda County v. Brennan, 608 F. 2d 1319 (9 Cir. 1979), cert,
denied, 447 U.S. 921,100 S. Ct. 3010,65 L.Ed. 2d 1112 (1980); Coles v. Havens Realty
Corp., 633 F. 2d 384 (4 Cir. 1980).
Ripeness—Myers v. Bethlehem Corp., 303 U.S. 41,50-51,58 S. Ct. 459,463,82
L.Ed. 638 (1938); United States v. Abilene and Southern Ry., 265 U.S. 274,282,44 S.
Ct. 565,567,68 L.Ed. 1016 (1924); Kale v. United States, 489 P. 2d 449,454 (9* Cir.
1973), cert, denied, 417 U.S. 915,94 S. Ct. 2617,41 L.Ed. 2d 220 (1974); Parisi v.
Davidson, 405 U.S. 34,37,92 S. Ct. 815,818,31 L.Ed. 2d 17 (1972); Pence v. Kleppe,
529 F. 2d 135,143 (9 Cir. 1976).
Constitutionality—New York City Transit Authority v. Beazer, 440 U.S. 568,
582,99 S. Ct. 1355,1364,59 L.Ed. 2d 587 (1979). Spector Motor Service, Inc. v.
McLaughlin, 323 U.S. 101,105,65 S. Ct. 152,154,89 L.Ed. 101 (1944).
W ithdraw al under mineral leasing laws—Udall v. Tollman, 380 U.S. 1,85 S.
Ct. 792,13 L.Ed. 2d 616 (1965). Mecham v. Udall, 369 F. 2d 1 (10 Cir. 1966).
Mountain States Legal Foundation v. Andrus, 499 F. Supp. 383 (D.Wyo. 1980).
Secretary's pow er to revoke order—State of Alaska v. Carter, 462 F. Supp.
1155,1157 (D.Alaska, 1978).
D uration established bv committee—Chadha v. Immigration and
Naturalization Service, 634 F. 2d 408.
Emergency Land W ithdrawals
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Sierra Club v. Yeutter
911 F. 2 d 1405 <10* Cir. 1990)
Case H istory
615 F. Supp. 44 (1985)—remanded with directions for federal defendants to
complete a "memorandum explaining their analysis, final decision, and plan to comply
with their statutory obligations..." by 622 F, Supp. 842 (D. Colo. 1985)—defendants'
appeal denied due to lack of finality by Sierra Club v. Lyng, Nos. 86-1153,86-1154 &
86-1155 (10* Cir. 1986)—holding that federal water rights exist in Colorado wilderness
areas affirmed by Sierra Club v. Lyng, 661 F. Supp. 1490 (D. Colo. 19S7)—final
judgment declared by Sierra Club v. Lyng, No. 84-M-2 (D. Colo. 1988)—vacated and
remanded with directions by present case.
Background
This case focused on w hether federal reserved water rights existed in
Colorado wilderness areas. The Colorado wilderness areas in question were part
of the National W ilderness Preservation System, which was created by the
National W ilderness Act of 1964. 16 U.S.C. § 1131 et seq.
The defendants and intervenors appealed the final decision of the District
C ourt of Colorado w hich stated that federal reserved w ater rights existed in
federally-designated Colorado wilderness areas. Sierra Club v. Lyng, No. 84-M-2
(D.Colo. Sept. 30,1988).
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The court of appeals ruled that the managem ent of federally reserved
w ater rights should be left to agency discretion. In its decision, the court
overturned the district court's decision and created a non-binding precedent.
Result
The appeal was dismissed. The judgm ent of the district court granting
declaratory judgm ent that federal reserved w ater rights were created by the
W ilderness Act w as vacated. The case was rem anded "w ith directions to dismiss
the complaint as not ripe for adjudication." 911 F. 2d 1405.
Other Cases Referenced
N onassertion of reserved w ater rights—Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821,105
S. Ct. 1649,84 L. Ed. 2d 714 (1985).
Doctrine of separation of pow ers—Sierra Club v. Department of the Interior,
424 F. Supp. 172,175 (N.D. Cal. 1976).
Determining the proper m ethod of analysis—Abbott Laboratories v.
Gardner, 387 U.S. 136,87 S. Ct. 1507,18 L. Ed. 2d 681 (1967); Toilet Goods
Association v. Gardner (Toilet Goods I), 387 U.S. 158,87 S. Ct. 167,87 S. Ct. 1526,18
L. Ed. 2d 704 (1967).
Agency action reviewability—Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, 401
U.S. 402,91 S. Ct. 814,28 L. Ed. 2d 136 (1971); Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 402,105
S. Ct. 1649,84 L. Ed. 2d 714 (1985); Dunlop v. Bachowski, 421 U.S. 560,95 S. Ct.
1851,44 L. Ed. 2d 377 (1975); Webster v. Doe, 486 U.S. 592,108 S. Ct. 2047,100 L.
Ed. 2d 632 (1988).
Federal Reserved Water Rights
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Application of reviewability standard—Adams v. Richardson, 480 F. 2d
1159,1162 (D C. Cir. 1973) (en banc); Kola, Inc. v. United States, 882 F. 2d 361,36364 (9 ‘h Cir. 1989); Laird v. Tatum, 408 U.S. 1,15,92 S. Ct. 2318,2326,33 L. Ed. 2d
154 (1971).
Was the issue ripe for decision—Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U.S.
136,87 S. Ct. 1507,18 L. Ed. 2d 681 (1967); Toilet Goods 1, 387 U.S. 158,87 S. Ct.
1520,18 L. Ed. 2d 697 (1967); Pacific Gas & Electric Co. v. State Energy Resources
Conservation & Development Commission, 461 U. S. 190,103 S. Ct. 1713,75 L. Ed. 2d
752 (1983); United States v. New Mexico, 438 U.S. 696,698,98 S. Ct. 3012,3013,57
L. Ed. 2d 1052 (1978) (scope of federal reserved w ater rights turn on
congressional intent); Cappaert v. United States, 426 U.S. 128,138,96 S. Ct. 2062,
2069,48 L. Ed. 2d 523 (1976) (reserved w ater rights can arise by implication from
reservations of land); FTC v. Standard Oil Co., 449 U.S. 232,239-40,101 S. Ct. 488,
493,6 6 L. Ed. 2d 416 (1980); Lujan v. National Wildlife Federation, 496 U.S. —, 110 S.
Ct. 3177, 111 L. Ed. 2d 695 (1990); McKart v. United States, 395 U.S. 185,89 S. Ct.
1657,1663,23 L. Ed. 2d 194 (1969); U.S. v. Bell, 724 P. 2d 631,641-42 (Colo. 1986)
(en banc); United States v. City & County of Denver, 656 P. 2d 1,34-35 (Colo. 1983)
(en banc); Navajo Development Co. v. Sanderson, 655 P. 2d 1374,1379 (Colo. 1982)
(en banc).
Determ ining jurisdiction— Familia de Boom v. Arosa Mercantil, S.A., 629 F,
2d 1134,1137 (5 th Cir. 1980), cert, denied, 451 U.S. 1008,101 S. Ct. 2345,68 L. Ed. 2d
861 (1981); Sherman v. American Fed'n of Musicians, 588 F. 2d 1313,1314 (10 * Cir.
Federal Reserved W ater Rights
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1978), cert, denied, 444 U.S. 825,100 S. Ct. 46,62 L. Ed. 2d 31 (1979); Northern Ind.
Pub. Serv. Co. v. FERC, 782 F. 2d 730, 746 (7* Cir. 1986); Environmental Defense
Fund V. Ruckelshaus, 439 F. 2d 584,596 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
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W right V. United States
868 F. Supp. 930 (E.D. Tenn. 1994)

Case H istory
Affirmed without opinion by 82 F. 3d 419 (6 “»Cir. 1996).
Background
The Joyce Kilmer-Slickrock W ilderness (Slickrock) is part of the N antahala
N ational Forest in w estern N orth Carolina. Slickrock was designated as
wilderness in 1975. Pub. L. No. 93-622, § 3(a)(7), 88 Stat. 2097 Qan. 3,1975). The
plaintiffs w ere hiking on Slickrock Creek Trail in the Slickrock Wilderness on
April 11,1991, w hen a rotting tree fell across the trail on which they were hiking.
Ms. W right claimed she w as knocked unconscious and injured her left leg which
required subsequent am putation above the knee. Ms. Acuff claimed she was
knocked unconscious as well and received injuries to both legs, suffered broken
ribs, and various cuts.
P laintiffs' Identities an d C ontentions
Gladys W right and her husband, H enry L. Wright, and Christine Acuff.
Plaintiffs brought a negligence action against the United States under the
Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA), 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(b), 2674, for the injuries they
received from the falling tree (including loss of consortium for Mr. Wright). The
plaintiffs argued negligence because (1 ) the trail w as not appropriately inspected;
(2) the rotting tree w as not rem oved before it fell on the trail; (3) there were no
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signs posted w arning of the danger of falling trees; and (4) the plaintiffs were
perm itted to hike on the trail. The plaintiffs am ended their original complaint by
including that the defendants violated the Forest Service's Land and Resource
M anagement Plan.
D efendant's Identity and C ontentions
United States of America, defendant.
Defendant argued that (1) "the discretionary function of the FTCA
prohibits judicial review of United States' policies and decisions regarding
vdldem ess management; (2) the N orth Carolina Trails and Hikers Act bars the
action; and (3) the United States did not owe plaintiffs a duty under North
Carolina law." 868 F. Supp. at 931.
Case Issue
Did the Forest Service's failure to cut dow n rotting tree in wilderness fall
w ithin "the discretionary function exception to the Federal Torts Claim Act
(FTCA) waiver of sovereign immunity?"
Court's H olding
On w hether the Forest Service's decision not to cut dow n rotting tree in
wilderness fell w ithin "the discretionary function exception" to the liability of the
federal governm ent: The court held that the Forest Service's decision fell within
the discretionary function exception to liability of the federal government.
Because the decision w as w ithin the discretionary function exception, the court
lacked jurisdiction.
Trail Maintenance
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The United States Is immune from being sued for tort claims because of its
sovereign status except w here a "clear relinquishm ent" of imm unity is present.
The Federal Torts Claim Act generally waives the sovereign imm unity of the
U nited States in cases w here the suit filed is "for injury or loss of property, or
personal injury or death caused by the negligent or w rongful act or omission of
any employee of the G overnm ent while acting w ithin the scope of his office or
em ployment." 28 U.S.C. § 1345(b). The FTCA contains a num ber of exceptions
to this general waiver of imm unity. The discretionary function exception
exempts the U nited States from liability for
any claim based upon an act or omission of an employee of the
Government, exercising due care, in the execution of a statute or
regulation, w hether or not such statute or regulation be valid, or
based upon the exercise or performance or failure to exercise or
perform a discretionary function or duty on the part of the federal
agency or an employee of the Government, w hether or not the
discretion involved be abused. 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a).
The Supreme Court established a tw o-part test to determine w hether the
governm ent's actions fall w ithin the discretionary function exception. United
States V. Gaubert, 499 U.S. at 322-324, 111 S. Ct. at 1274. A court m ust first decide
w hether the alleged act or failure to act violated a "m andatory regulation or
policy that allowed no judgm ent or choice." 868 F. Supp. at 932. If the
government employee w as required to act in a prescribed manner w ithout
exercising judgment, the discretionary function exception does not apply, and
the court has jurisdiction. If the employee is entitled to exercise discretion,
how ever, the court m ust reach the second part of the test, and determine w hether
Trail Maintenance
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that judgm ent is of the kind "that the discretionary function exception was
designed to shield." 868 F. Supp. at 932, quoting Berkowitz v. United States, 486
U.S. 531,536 (1988).
In applying the tw o-part test here, the district court focused on the
m anual prom ulgated by the Forest Service, the Land émd Resource M anagement
Plan 1986-2000, N antahala and Pisgah N ational Forest (Management Plan or
Plan). The parties agreed that, pursuant to the Plan, the Slickrock Creek Trail
w as to m aintained at Level 1 or 2. Referring to maintenance requirements, the
M anagem ent Plan states:
Removal of tree that could fall across the trail. Fell only trees likely
to fall on or across the trail. Fell aw ay from trail. Remove any slash
from corridor. No hazard tree removal in wilderness. FREQUENCY:
2 years or less, depending on tim ber type. M anagement Plan Table
G-5, p. G-9. (emphasis added).
The parties disagreed about the effect of this provision. The government argued
that because the Slickrock Creek Trail is in a designated wilderness area, the Plan
forbade the Forest Service from felling any trees because there is to be "[n]o
hazard tree removal in wilderness." Plaintiffs argued that that phrase does not
apply to trails m the wilderness, w hich are governed by the first part of the
quotation from the Plan, i.e., "[f]ell only trees likely to fall on or across the trail."
See 868 F. Supp. at 935.
Rather than resolving this issue, the court assumed arguendo that the
provision of the Plan that stated that no trees were to be felled in the wilderness
did n ot apply to trees near trails. 868 F. Supp. at 9351 The court then concluded
Trail Maintenance
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that the provision, "[f]ell only trees likely to fall on or across the trail," was not
m andatory and did not require the Forest Service to remove all trees that m ight
fall across trails, b u t merely specified those trees w hich may be removed. It
concluded that the guidelines for trail maintenance allowed Forest Service
employees maximum discretion. 868 F. Supp. at 936.
Having concluded that the governm ent met the first part of the Gaubert
test in that the act w as discretionary, the court then proceeded to the second part
of the test, i.e., w hether the discretionary function exception was designed to
shield this type of judgm ent. 868 F. Supp. at 936. It concluded that "Plaintiffs'
allegations regarding the Forest Service's hazardous tree inspection and removal
procedures, and the decisions on how to comply w ith those inspections and
procedures, are clearly w ithin the scope of the discretionary function exception."
868 F. Supp. at 936.

The court did not address the state law issues raised by the United States.
Result
The court found that plaintiff's "claims are barred by the discretionary
function exception to the FTCA, 28 U.S.C.A. §2680 (a)" and aw arded the
defendant's m otion for dismissal. 868 F. Supp. at 937.
O ther Cases Referenced
United States sovereignty— United States v. Sherwood, 312 U.S. 584,586,61
S. Ct. 767,769-770,85 L.Ed. 1058 (1941).
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"Clear relinquishment" of sovereign im m unity— Dalehite v. United States,
346 U.S. 15,31,73 S. Ct. 956,965,97 L.Ed. 1427 (1953).
Federal Tort Claims Act—United States v. Orleans, 425 U.S. 807,813,96 S.
Ct. 1971,1975,48 L.Ed.2d 390 (1976); Kurinsky v. United States, 33 F. 3d 594,596
(6 * Cir. 1994); Sherwood, 312 U.S. at 586-87,61 S. Ct. at 769-70; United States v.
Kubrick, 444 U.S. I l l , 100 S. Ct. 352,62 L.Ed.2d 259 (1986); United States v. S A .
Empressa de Viacao Aerea Rio Grandense (Varig Airlines), 467 U.S. 797,808,104 S. Ct.
2755,2762,81 L.Ed.2d 660 (1984).
Two part test—discretionary function exception—United States v. Gaubert,
499 U.S. 315,322-24, 111 S. Ct. 1267,1273-74,113 L.Ed.2d 335 (1991); Berkovitz v.
United States, 486 U.S. 531,536,108 S. Ct. 1954,1958,100 L.Ed.2d 531 (1988); Varig
Airlines, 467 U.S. at 813,104 S. Ct. at 2765, Dalehite, 346 U.S. at 36,73 S. Ct. at 968;
Gaubert, 499 U.S. at 324, 111 S. Ct. at 1274.
FTCA §2680 fa) application even if there is negligence—Dalehite, 346 U.S.
at 32,73 S. Ct. at 966, Id. at 33,73 S. Ct. at 966, Autery v. United States, 992 F. 2d
1523 (ll*h Cir. 1993); Zumwalt v. United States, 928 F. 2d 951 (10 »^ Cir. 1991); Baum
V.

United States, 986 F. 2d 716 (4*^ Cir. 1993).
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Appendix A
Statutes in Wilderness Case Law
W ilderness Act of 1964,16 U.S.C.A. §§ 1131 et seq.
Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C .§ 706
Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act of 1977,30 U.S.C. §§ 1201 et seq.
Federal Land Policy and M anagem ent Act of 1976,43 U.S.C. §§ 1701 et seq.
Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346
National Environmental Policy Act, 42 U.S.C.A. § 4332 et seq.
Aléiska N ational Lands Conservation Act, 16 U.S.C. § 3101 et seq.
Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act, 43 U.S.C. § 1601 et seq.

Regulations in Wilderness Case Law
Forest Service Regulations, Code of Federal Regulations, Title 36
Forest Service website: www.fs.gov
BLM Regulations, Code of Federal Regulations, Title 43
Bureau of Land M anagem ent website: www.blm.gov
Park Service Regulations, Code of Federal Regulations, Title 36
Park Service website: w w w.nps.gov
Fish and Wildlife Service Regulations, Code of Federal Regulations, Title 1
Fish and Wildlife Service website: www.fws.gov
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A ppendix A Continued
C onstitutional A m endm ents in W ilderness Case Law
Property Clause, U nited States Constitution, Article IV, § 3, cl. 2
U nited States Constitution, Fifth A m endm ent

Appendix A
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A ppendix B
Legal Definitions
source: Black's Law Dictionary
ARBITRARY. Means in an "arbitrary' m anner, as fixed or done capriciously
or at pleasure; w ithout adequate determ ining principle; not founded in the
nature of things; nonjrational; not done or acting according to reason or
judgm ent; depending on the will alone; absolutely in power; capriciously;
tyrannical; despotic; Com eil v. Swisher County, Tex.Civ.App., 78 S.W.2d
1072,1074. W ithout fair, solid, and substantial cause; that is, w ithout cause
based upon the law. U.S. v. Lotempio, D.C.N.Y., 58 F.2d 358,359; not
governed by any fixed rules or standard. People ex. rel. H utlm an v. Gilchrist,
188 N.Y.S. 61,65,114 Misc. 651.
ARGUENDO. In arguing; in the course of the argument. A statem ent or
observation m ade by a judge as a m atter of argum ent or illustration, but not
directly bearing upon the case at bar, or only incidentally involved in it, is
said (in the reports) to be m ade arguendo, or in the abbreviated form, arg.
ARGUMENT. An effort to establish belief by a course of reasoning.
In rhetoric and logic, an inference draw n from premises, the tru th of
w hich is indisputable, or at least highly probable.
BAD FAITH. The opposite of "good faith," generally implying or involving
actual or constructive fraud, or a design to mislead or deceive another, or a
neglect or refusal to fulfill some d uty or some contractual obligation, not
prom pted by an innocent mistake as to one's rights or duties, but by some
interested or sinister motive. State v. Griffin, 100 B.C. 331,84 S.E. 876,877;
Penn Mut. L. Ins. Co. v. Mechanics' Savings Bank & Trust Co., C.C.A. Term.,
73 F. 653,19 C.C.A. 316,38 L.R.A. 33^ 70; Spiegel v. Beacon Participations, 297
Mass. 398,8 N.E.2d 895,907.
COLLATERAL. By the side; at the side; attached upon the side. N ot lineal,
but upon a parallel or diverging line. Additional or auxiliary;
supplem entary; co-operating; accompanying as a secondary fact; or acting as
a secondary agent; related to, complementary; accompanying as a co
ordinate, City Investm ent & Loan Co. v. Wichita H ardw are Co.,
Tex.Civ.App., 57 S.W.2d 222, 223; collateral security. Pepper v. Beville, 100
Fla. 97,129 So. 334,337.
COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL. The collateral determ ination of a question by a
court having general jurisdiction of the subject. Small v. Haskins, 26 Vt. 209.
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GOOD FAITH. Honesty of intention, and freedom from knowledge of
circumstances which ought to p u t the holder upon inquiry. Siano v.
Helvering, D.C.N.J., 13 F.Supp. 776,780. An honest intention to abstain from
taking any unconscientious advantage of another, even through technicalities
of law, together w ith absence of all information, notice, or benefit or belief of
facts which render transactions unconscientious. Warfield N atural Gas Co. v.
Allen, 248 Ky. 646,59 S.W.2d 534,91 A.L.R. 890; Crouch v. First Nat. Bank,
156 m. 342,40 N.E. 974; W augh v. Prince, 121 Me. 67,115 A. 612,614.
JUDGMENT. An opinion or estimate. McClung Const. Co. v. Muncy,
Tex.Civ.App., 65 S.W.2d 786,790.
The form ation of an opinion or notion concerning some thing by
exercising the m ind upon it. Cleveland Clinic Foundation v. Humphreys,
C.C.A. Ohio, 97 F.2d 849,857.
The official and authentic decision of a court of justice upon the
respective rights and claims of parties to an action or suit therein litigated and
subm itted to its determ ination. People v. Hebei, 19 Colo.App. 523,76 P. 550;
Bullock V . Bullock, 52 N.J.Eq. 561,30 A. 676,27 L.R.A. 213,46 Am.St.Rep. 528;
State V . Brown & Sharpe Mfg. Co., 18 R.1.16,25 A. 246,17 L.R.A. 856.
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